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TRICK OR TREAT? SUMMARY JUD)GMENT
IN TENNESSEE AFTER HANNAN v. ALL TEL
PUBLISHING CO.
JUDY M. CORNETT*

1. INTRODUCTION

These are scary times for summary judgment, both on the federal level and
in Tennessee. A scholarly debate has erupted about whether the federal version
of summary judgment violates the Seventh Amendment.' In Tennessee, on
Halloween 2008, the Tennessee Supreme Court reaffirmed its rejection of the
federal Celotex standard 2 in Hannanv. Alitel PublishingCo.' In the words of
one trial judge, Hannan has become the most-discussed Tennessee case "in
recent memory ." The predominant reaction to Hannanby the trial bench and
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. IJam indebted
to Dwight Aarons, Dennis McCarthy, Judy McCarthy, Don Paine, Penny White, and John
Winemiller for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I am also indebted to
Prince Chambliss, Mark Jendrek, Doug Pierce, Jenny Rogers, Paula Schaefer, Chancellor John
F. Weaver, and Lela Young, among others, for insightful conversations about summary
judgment. I am grateful to the sponsors of and attendees at the CLE programs I have presented
on summary judgment. I have also benefitted from CLE presentations by Judge Charles J.
Susano, Jr., Chancellor Daryl R. Fansler, and Judge Wheeler A. Rosenbalm. IJam grateful to my
research assistants, Matt Drake, Todd Heird, Ryan Hofthman, Jon Meagher, and Sarah Swan
Siedentopf, for outstanding research assistance over a number of years. For their encouragement
and support, I am grateful to Ben Barton, Doug Blaze, Joan Heminway, Carol Parker, and Greg
Stein. Finally, I wish to thank the Editorial Board and staff of the Tennessee Law Review,
especially Editor in Chief Joseph Hubbard and Executive Editor Emily Lay for their skillful
assistance. The views expressed in this Article and any remaining errors are my own.
1. See Suja A. Thomas, The UnconstitutionalityofSummary Judgment: A Status Report,
93 JOWA L. REv. 1613 (2008); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional,
93 VA. L. REv. 139 (2007); ef Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. E2006-01021-COA-R3-CV,
2007 WL 1958644, at *8-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 2007) (Susano, J., dissenting) (citing
TENN. CONSI. art. 1, 16 which states that "the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate")
(Judge Susano opined that the grant of summary judgment where nonmovant has presented
evidence creating genuine issue of material fact would violate state constitutional right), rev'd
271 S.W.3d 76 (Tenn. 2008). But see Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment Is Constitutional,93
JOWA L. R~v. 1625 (2008).
2. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (holding that a party moving for
summary judgment need only show that the opposing party lacks evidence sufficientto support
an essential element of its case).
3. 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008).
4. Notes by Judy Cornett from presentation by Chancellor Daryl Fansler, Knox County
Chancery Court, Hannanv. Ailtel-Is Summary Judgment Dead?, Continuing Legal Education
program at East Tennessee Lawyers Association for Women, Knoxville, Tennessee (Sept. 16,
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the bar seems to be trepidation; most commentators believe that Hannan has
driven a stake through the heart of summary judgment in Tennessee. Perhaps
motivated by the ghostly specter of post-Hannan summary judgment-or
perhaps envisioning summary judgment as a zombie, the living dead walking
among us-commentators are engaged in a lively debate and discussion about
the proper role of summary judgment. While most are ready to consign
summary judgment to the graveyard, in this article I argue that summary
judgment is alive and well in Tennessee.
In this Article, I use the Hannan decision as an occasion to re-examine
Tennessee summary judgment law.5 In Part 11, 1 summarize Tennessee's
current summary judgment standard and outline the history of summary
judgment in Tennessee, from the earliest period up to Hannan. In Part 111, 1
examine Hannanin detail, from the trial court proceedings, to the Application
for Permission to Appeal, to the disposition on remand. In Part IV, I address
the prevalent assumption that Tennessee's standard is pro-plaintiff and antidefendant. Part IV also addresses some of the practical implications of Hannan
and evaluates Tennessee's summary judgment standard and some of the
possible rationales for Tennessee's rejection of Celotex.
11. THE CURRENT TENNESSEE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD AND THE
HISTORY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN TENNESSEE

A. The Current Standard
6

Tennessee has rejected the federal standard for summary judgment .
Under the 1986 United States Supreme Court decision, Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett,a movant who does not have the burden of proof at trial may properly
move for summary judgment "by 'showing'-that is, pointing out to the
district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party's case." The Celotex Court held that nothing in Federal Rule of Civil

2009) (on file with the Tennessee Law Review) [hereinafter Remarks by Chancellor Daryl
Fansler]. Chancellor Fansler compared the impact of Hannanto that of AMfcntyre v. Ralentine,
833 S.W.2d 56 (Tenn. 1992), which adopted comparative fault, and Hodges v. S.C. Toof& Co.,
833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992), which established standards for the awarding of punitive
damages. Remarks by Chancellor Daryl Fansler, supra.
5. In an earlier article, I examined Tennessee summary judgment law as it existed in
2001. Judy M. Cornett, The Legacy of Byrd v. Hall: Gossiping About Summary Judgment in
Tennessee, 69 TENN. L. REv. 175 (2001).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 71-115.
7. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The Court's opinion was written
by Justice Rehinquist, joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, White, and O'Connor. Id at 318.
Justice White concurred. Id at 328 (White, J., concurring). Justice Brennan dissented, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Id. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
filed a separate dissent. Id at 318 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is tempting to treat the Court's
opinion as a plurality because Justice White's concurrence contains often-competing analysis.
See Cornett, supra note 5, at 179-80.
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Procedure 56 required the movant to support its motion for summary judgment
with evidence of its own. Thus, a pure Celotex motion is unsupported by
evidence. 9 Rather than presenting its own evidence to negate, attack, or
dispute the nonmovant's claim, the party who makes a pure Celotex motion
simply dares its opponent to "'put up or shut up."' 10 The Celotex Court held
that such a motion is sufficient to shift the burden to the nonmovant of
producing evidence to support the challenged element of its claim." The Court
also held that this evidence must be sufficient to withstand a motion for
directed verdict, if produced at trial. 12
In a series of cases beginning with Byrd v. Hall in 1993,13 the Tennessee
Supreme Court rejected the Celotex standard for summary judgment. 14 In the
leading post-Byrd summary judgment case, McCarley v. West Quality Food
Service, s the court, speaking through now-Chief Justice Holder, declared
unequivocally:
A party seeking summary judgment must demonstrate the absence of any
genuine and material factual issues. Mere "conclusory assertion[s] that the
non-moving party has no evidence is clearly insufficient." The movant must
either affirmatively negate an essential element ofthe non-movant's claim or
conclusively establish an affirmative defense. If the movant does not negate a
claimed basis for the suit, the non-movant's burden to produce either

8. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
9. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Here and throughout, I use the term "pure Celotex motion"
to mean a motion, unsupported by evidence, that merely points out that the nonmovant lacks
evidence of an essential element of its claim.
10. Street v. J.C. Bradford& Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1989). Another type of
motion that would be sufficient under Celotex-but insufficient under Tennessee's standard-is
a motion supported by evidentiary material that does not negate an element ofthe nonmovant's
claim. See, e.g., McCarley v. W. Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1998); Madison v.
Love, No. E2000-01692-COA-RM-CV, 2000 WL 1036362 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2000).
11. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
12. Id.The Court clarified that the nonmovant's response need not be in admissible form:
the nonmovant need not "depose her own witnesses." Id.
13. 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993).
14. Id.; see Cornett,supranote 5, at 175. Despite the Byrdcourt's clear rejection ofpure
Celotex motions, the court appeared to express approval of Celotex and the 1986 trilogy,
including Anderson v. LibertyLobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and MatsushitaElectric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 214 ("Today, we ...
embrace the construction of Rule 56 in Anderson, Celotex, and Matsushita to the extent
discussed in the prior section of this opinion relating to those cases."). As we shall see, this
"embrace" of Celotex encouraged later courts and commentators to argue that the Tennessee
Supreme Court had adopted the Celotex standard for summary judgment. See cases cited infra
note 80; infra text accompanying note 115.

15. 960 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1998).
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supporting affidavits or discovery
materials is not triggered and the motion
16
for summary judgment fails.
Because a motion that is totally unsupported by evidence can never
"4affirmatively negate" an essential element of the nonmovant' s case, a pure
Celotex motion is invalid in Tennessee; that is, a pure Celotex motion will not
17
shift the burden of production to the nonovant.
B. The History of Summary Judgment in Tennessee
1. The Earliest Period
18
It is homnbook law that there was no summary judgment at common law.
Tennessee operated under common law pleading and practice rules until the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, modeled on the federal rules, were
adopted in 1971.19 However, there were, in fact, several analogues to summary
judgment in Tennessee's civil procedure prior to 1971: 'judgment by motion,"
20
challenge to a pauper's oath, and the "agreed case."9
The common law of Tennessee recognized a species of what legal scholar
and historian Abraham Caruthers calls "summary judgment[]," or 'judgment
by motion. ,2 hs ee actions brought by a plaintiff against a 2government
official, without the usual requirements of pleading or summons. According

16. Id. at 588 (quoting Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 214-15) (alteration in original) (internal
citations omitted).
17. Frazee v. Med Ctr. Inns of Am., Inc., No. 01A01-9301-CV-00034, 1993 WL 312674,
at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1993).
Because the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that there is
no disputed material issue of fact, it is insufficient for the moving party merely to state that
there is no evidence. When the moving party properly supports its motion, the non-movant
must submit facts sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Id. (citation omitted); accord Cate v. Samsonite Furniture Co., No. 03A01I-9406-CV-00228,
1994 WL 706620, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1994) (bare assertion of lack of evidence is
insufficient).
18. LAWRENCE A. PIVNicK, TENNESSEE CIRCUIT COURT PRACTICE § 27:5, at 362 (2010);
see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 483 S.W.2d 719, 719 (Tenn. 1972)
(noting adoption of Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and opining that "probably the most
far-reaching departure from the past was in the adoption of Rule 56, allowing cases to be
disposed of on motion for summary judgment.").
19. Allstate Ins. Co., 483 S.W.2d at 719.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 21-39.

21.

ABRAHAm CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT

§§ 420-490, at 432-77 (Andrew B.

Martin, ed., 3d ed. 1888); see also Allstate Ins. Co., 483 S.W.2d at 719 ("Prior to the adoption
of these Rules in Tennessee summary judgment was known only in connection with summary
remedies against certain public officers."). Although here and throughout, I describe pre-Rules
law as the "common law," much of that law, including the summary procedures described
below, was statutory. See CARUTHERS, SUpra § 420, at 432.
22. CARUTHERS, supra note 21, §§ 435-438, at 441-46. These actions were codified at
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to Caruthers, the action was most commonly brought by a judgment creditor
against the sheriff in three situations: "1. Where he fails to make due and
proper return of the execution. 2. When he makes a false or insufficient return.
23
3. When he fails to pay over money collected on the execution.",
The action could also be brought against the clerk of court, if he had
24
received money from the sheriff and had failed to pay it over to the plaintiff.

Interestingly, because an attorney is an "officer of the court," a judgment by
motion could also be brought against himn, if the attorney had received money
from the sheriff and had failed to pay that money over to the client. 25 In all
these cases, the only necessary, permissible evidence was (1) certified copies
of the execution, (2) the sheriff s receipt for the execution, and (3) the clerk's
certificate of its non-return.2 Indeed, Caruthers warns that a judgment by
motion for a false return by the sheriff was not available unless the return
"cappears on its face to be false. If it requires extraneous evidence to show its
falsity, the plaintiff must resort to his regular common law action .... ~2
Another common law analogue to summary judgment was the challenge to
a pauper's oath. 28 According to Caruthers, the defendant could move to
dismiss a suit brought on a pauper's oath "at any time before the trial, upon
showing to the court, by the affidavits of disinterested persons, that the
plaintiff s allegation of poverty is probably untrue, or that the cause of action
is frivolous or malicious.",29 The plaintiff could then "introduce the affidavits
of other disinterested persons, to show that the allegation of poverty is
probably true, or that he has probably a good cause of action.",30 Although
Caruthers does not specify how the court should resolve competing affidavits
regarding the plaintiff s poverty, he does caution: "The evidence would have
to be very clear and one-sided that the cause of action
was frivolous, to justify
31
the dismission of the suit on that ground alone.",
Finally, the common law procedure most akin to today's summary
judgment was the "Agreed Case ." According to Caruthers, "[w]hen a suit is
regularly brought, [the parties] may agree upon the facts in the case, and
submit it to the decision of the court.... Such agreed case is equivalent to a
special verdict.",33 Caruthers advises that the parties' agreement should be in
TENN. CODE AN'N. §25-3-101 et seq. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee comments.
23. CARuTHERS, supra note 21, § 421, at 432.

24. Id§ 465, at461.
25. Id§ 468, at463.
26. Id § 423, at 433.
27. Id § 425, at 435.
28. Id § 81, at 168. A pauper's oath was a claim of poverty by a plaintiff which allowed
the plaintiff to avoid paying security for litigation costs. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 67,
1176 (9th ed. 2009).
29. CARuTHERS, supra note 2 1, § 8 1, at 168.
30. Id
31. Id § 81, at 169.
32. Id § 506, at 490.
33. Id
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writing.3 In order to avoid "fictitious cases,"3 the law required that "[o]n
presenting the agreement to the court, the parties or their attorneys must make
affidavit that the controversy is a real one, and that the proceeding is in good
faith to determine the rights of the parties.",36 In an agreed case, no evidence
was submitted, and the parties bore the costs equally, "unless they otherwise
agree ld] ." As in other cases, either party could appeal 3.
From these common law analogues to summary judgment, we see that,
even in a system that assumed an unbroken arc between pleadings and trial,
Tennessee recognized that some cases were suitable for disposition "on the
papers." However, these instances were few, and their rarity reflected
39
skepticism about all but the most "official documents."
2. Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure
In 1971, Tennessee adopted its version of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . 40 The two central provisions of Tennessee's summary judgment
rule were identical to their federal counterparts and have remained virtually
unchanged since their adoption. Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.01
reads as follows:
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of thirty
(30) days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion
for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting
affidavits
for a summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part
41
thereof.
Like its federal counterpart, Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04 requires
the entry of summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,

34. Id. at 491.
35. Id § 507, at 492.
36. Idat4 91.
37. Id at 492.
38. Id
39. Compare the acceptance of certified copies of evidence of official action with the
extra measure of caution required when private parties prepared the papers and agreed on the
facts. See supra text accompanying notes 21-36.
40. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 483 S.W.2d 719,719 (Tenn.
1972).
41. TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.01; cf FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2008) (identical to Tennessee Rule
of Civil Procedure 56.01 except permitting motion to be filed after twenty days from
commencement of action). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended effective
December 1,2009, to put them into "plain English." Therefore, the version of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure referred to here is the pre-2009 version.
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show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving
42
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.",
Rule 56 was adopted "to the end that litigation may be accelerated,

insubstantial issues removed, and trial confined only to genuine issues.",43 The
conditions precedent to summary judgment-no genuine issue of material fact
and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law-justified forgoing a trial
because under the common law, a fact issue was the sine qua non of trial .
Indeed, the whole point of the convoluted dance of pleadings-the sequence of
declaration, plea, replication, rejoinder, sur rejoinder, rebutter, and sur
rebutter-was to whittle the case down to a triable issue of fact. 45 Therefore,
Rule 56 simply embodies the common law's recognition that if there is no
factual dispute, there is no need for a trial. The second condition precedent to
summary judgment-entitlement to judgment as a matter of law-simply
reflected the common law view of the role of the judge as the arbiter of the
law. As demonstrated by the "Agreed Case," the courts of Tennessee had
always been empowered to decide legal questions upon agreed facts.4 Rule 56
simply instantiated this judicial function into the rules of civil procedure.4
42. TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.04 (originally TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.03 (1971)); cf FED. R. Civ. P.
56(c) (2008).
43. TENN. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee comments.
44. CARuTHERs, supra note 21, § 104, at 195 ("When the parties have reached an issue,
pleading is at an end .... The court can try nothing but the issue raised by the pleadings.").
45. Id § 117, at 206. This seemingly endless string of pleadings represented the
nightmare scenario of common-law pleading that was supposed to be addressed by the
simplicity of Code pleading and, later, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. My research in
cases appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court from the earliest days of the state through the
1840's reveals, however, that few cases proceeded further than the replication. See, e.g., Davis
v. Smith, Appeal from Greene County Circuit Court, Enrolled Law Causes from 1838 1843
Inclusive, Tennessee Supreme Court, 1-4 (showing sequence of complaint, answer, and
replication), available in Tennessee State Library and Archives (transcript on file with the
Tennessee Law Review); Lattures v. Huges, Appeal from Sullivan County Circuit Court,
EnrolledLaw Causesfrom 1838 1843 Inclusive, Tennessee Supreme Court, 458-60 (showing
sequence of complaint, answer, and replication), availahle in Tennessee State Library and
Archives (transcript on file with the Tennessee Law Review); Shaver v. Gaines, Appeal from
Sullivan County Circuit Court, Enrolled Law Causes from 1838 1843 Inclusive, Tennessee
Supreme Court, 463-64 (showing sequence of complaint, answer, and replication), available in
Tennessee State Library and Archives (transcript on file with the Tennessee Law Review). But
see Hunter v. Hunter, Appeal from Claiborne County Circuit Court, EnrolledLaw Causesfrom
1838 1843 Inclusive, Tennessee Supreme Court, 405-10 (defendant filed rejoinder to plaintiff's
replication), available in Tennessee State Library and Archives (transcript on file with the
Tennessee Law Review); Mayor & Aldermen of Knoxville v. Lindsay, Appeal from Knox
County Circuit Court, Enrolled Law Causes from 1838-1843 Inclusive, Tennessee Supreme
Court, 441-46 (defendant filed rejoinder to plaintiff's replication), available in Tennessee State
Library and Archives (transcript on file with the Tennessee Law Review).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
47. Cf Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 Wyo. L.J. 177, 179
(1958), reprintedin DONALD 1.LEVINE, DONALDL. DoERNBERG& MELISSAL. NELKEN, CIVIL
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However, Rule 56 was not limited to cases in which the parties agreedon
the facts. Instead, one party was permitted to move the court to find that the
facts were undisputed .4 Of course, at timnes the parties did stipulate to the
facts, and modem summary judgment cases reflect this phenomenon' 49 but in
the majority of summary judgment cases since 1971, the judge has been thrust
into a new pre-trial role: not just arbiter of the law but evaluator of facts.5
Absent agreement of the parties, how is the judge to determine whether the
case harbors a "genuine issue as to any material fact"? 51 The courts began
resolving this issue by assigning to the movant the burden of demonstrating
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 52As for how the movant must carry its
burden, Rule 56 itself provides some guidance: "A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is
sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a
summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof." 53 Thus,
from the beginning of summary judgment practice, the use of affidavits to
support a motion for summary judgment has been the norm.
From its inception, Rule 56 has also given some guidance on how the
nonmovant should respond to the motion. The current version provides as
follows:
PROCEDURE ANTHOLOGY 235, 235 (1998) ("But I want to say again that the rules in particular

parts are not new. They were not intended to be new as such. There was no thought of suddenly
developing a system which would be strange to everybody.").
48. TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.05.
49. See, e.g., West v. Wilson, No. 03A01-9409-CH-00348, 1995 WL 96796, at *4-5
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1995) (summary judgment appropriate when issue was the effect of a
statute extinguishing mineral rights and the case was submitted on statement of stipulated facts).
50. Recall that the "summary judgment" procedure at common law was available only as
long as the official did not dispute the official documents. CARUTHERs, supra note 2 1, § 506, at
490-91. If he did so, the dispute could be resolved only through a traditional common law
action. Id Thus, the common law judge did not have to evaluate the facts to determine whether
a dispute existed. Once a party stated that the facts were disputed, the sequence of pleading and
trial was invoked. S~ee id. § 117, at 206. This common law procedure should he compared with
Tennessee and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.05 and 56(d) respectively, which require
judges to determine whether certain facts are disputed. TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.05; FED. R. Civ. P.
5 6(d).
51. TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.04; see also Taylor v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 573 S.W.2d
476, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
52. Taylor, 573 S.W.2d at 480.
53. TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.02 (emphasis added). Rule 56.01 is virtually identical with
respect to summary judgment motions by claimants. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.01.
54. Compare the practice under the common law of attacking the pauper's oath with
affidavits. See CARUTHERS, supra note 21, § 80, at 168; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory
committee note to 1963 amendment ("A typical case is as follows: A party supports his motion
for summary judgment by affidavits or other evidentiary matter sufficient to show that there is
no genuine issue as to a material fact.") (going on to explain that noinmoving party cannot rest
on pleadings in this situation).
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When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of the adverse party's pleading, but his or her response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.5
The rule's admonition that the nonmovant cannot rest on the pleadings merely
reflects the obvious fact that the summary judgment motion interrupts the
smooth arc between pleadings and trial and poses the potential for a pretrial
disposition on the merits despite a factual dispute in the pleadings. If the
nonmovant cannot rest on the allegations of his pleadings, he must do
something else, or something more.
The nonmovant's burden was interpreted early on, in Fowler v. Happy
Goodman Family,56 probably the leading pre-Byrd summary judgment case in
Tennessee. There, the Happy Goodman Family sued a music promoter for
breach of contract, alleging that they had performed as promised under the
promotion contract but had not been paid .5 In his answer, the promoter
alleged fraud and misrepresentation in the inducement of the contract 5. The
Happy Goodman Family moved for summary judgment, attaching affidavits
that reiterated the allegations of the complaint .5 In response, the promoter
filed merely his own affidavit, which was based on "'information and belief,"'
regarding the alleged fraudulent statements. 60The Tennessee Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, pointing out that the
promoter's affidavit did not meet the evidentiary requirements of Rule 56.05 61
and did not set forth the kind of specific facts which would be legally required
to support a defense of fraud in the inducement. 62
What Fowler added to summary judgment jurisprudence was judicial
enforcement of Rule 56's requirement that evidentiary material be used to
rebut the motion for summary judgment. Permitting a movant's affidavits to
disrupt the arc from pleading to trial was not revolutionary; as we have seen,
the common law permitted the submission of affidavits to challenge a pauper's

TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.06.
56. 575 S.W.2d 496 (Tenn. 1978).
57. Id at 497.
58. Id
59. Id at 498. Note that the movants here supported the motion with affidavits. Thus,
Fowlerpresented no issue about whether the motion was sufficient under Rule 56.01. But see
infra text accompanying notes 242-50 (discussing insufficiency of a "conclusory affidavit" to
shift the burden of production).
60. Fowler, 575 S.W.2d at 497.
61. Id at 497-98. ("'Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."' (quoting
TFNNm.
R. Civ. P. 56.05 (1971) (renumbered as TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.06 July 1, 1997))).
62. Id at 499.

55.
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oath, which could potentially result in dismissal 6. Additionally, Rule 56.01
itself contemplated that the motion could be supported by affidavits.6 It was,
therefore, logical for the Fowler court to lift the summary judgment
proceeding out of the flow of the pleadings and to require the nonmovant to
rebut the motion with evidence meeting the requirements of Rule 56.06.
Indeed, the court implied that the parties in that case had not made good use of
the available discovery devices. It sent a clear signal to future litigants:
Absent any admissions in the [Happy Goodman Family's] pleadings which
would support aclaim of inducing fad... [,the promoter] was obligated to
take depositions, demand answers to interrogatories, submit requests for
admissions or, at a minimum, to file supporting affidavits containing facts
which, in the language of Rule 56.05, "would be admissible in evidence"~ in
support of his contention.6
Thus, as interpreted, Rule 56 represented Tennessee's recognition that the
introduction of formal discovery devices justified pretrial disposition on the
merits in cases where there were no factual issues.
Although the language of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 was
initially identical to that of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, with the
addition of § 56.03 to the Tennessee rules in 1997, Tennessee's rule diverged
significantly from the federal rule. 67TennesseRueo Civil Procedure 56
now contains a subsection that has no analogue in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure:
56.03. Specifying Material Facts. -In order to assist the Court in
ascertaining whether there are any material facts in dispute, any motion for
summary judgment made pursuant to Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure shall be accompanied by a separate concise statement of the
material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue
for trial. Each fact shall be set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph. Each
fact shall be supported by a specific citation to the record.
Any party opposing the motion for summary judgment must, not later
than five days before the hearing, serve and file a response to each fact set
forth by the movant either (i) agreeing that the fact is undisputed, (ii)
agreeing that the fact is undisputed for purposes of ruling on the motion for
63. CARun-JRs, supranote 2 1, § 81, at 168; see also id §§ 506-07, at 490 (asserting that
agreed cases also required submission of affidavits).
64. TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.01 (A party seeking recovery may "move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part
thereof.").
65. Fowler, 575 S.W.2d at 498 (indicating that although the case had been pending for
over a year when the motion was filed, the record reflected no discovery).
6 6. Id. at 499.
67. TENN4. R. Civ. P. 56.03 (1971) (amended 2000).
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summary judgment only, or (iii) demonstrating that the fact is disputed. Each
disputed fact must be supported by specific citation to the record. Such
response shall be filed with the papers in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment.
In addition, the non-movant's response may contain a concise statement
of any additional facts that the non-movant contends are material and as to
which the non-movant contends there exists a genuine issue to be tried. Each
such disputed fact shall be set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph with
specific citations to the record supporting the contention that such fact is in
dispute.
If the non-moving party has asserted additional facts, the moving party
shall be allowed to respond to these additional facts by filing a reply
statement in the same manner and form as specified above.6
The requirement that the parties specify and support the bases for their
motions and responses implies at least two things. First, it implies that, in
Tennessee, it is the job of the parties, not the courts, to scour the record for
supporting and opposing evidence. 69 Second, it implies that Tennessee's Rule
56 reflects a desire to keep summary judgment within strict limits. In other
words, forcing the parties to specify both the undisputed and disputed facts
and the evidence supporting each fact requires the parties to give thoughtful
consideration to their motions and responses. There is not, or at least there
should not be, any free-wheeling summary judgment practice in Tennessee. In
practical terms-if not in theory-Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03
acts as a screening device for summary judgment motions. Indeed, it seems
clear that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03 reflects a certain degree of
skepticism about summary judgment-skepticism that has its roots in common
law practice and is closely linked to Tennessee's rejection of the Celotex
standard .
68. TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.03. This subsection originated in the local rules of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.03 advisory
committee comment (1997); see also M.D. TENN. R. 56.01. The local rules of the Western
District of Tennessee also contain this specification requirement, W.D. TENN. R. 7.2(d)(2)-(3),
but interestingly, the local rules of the Eastern District of Tennessee do not. A number of federal
courts have adopted similar local rules. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. R. 56. 1.
69. Cf Hon. Bernice B. Donald & William C. Plouffe, Jr., The Summary Judgment
Process: When the Solution Becomes Part of the Problem, THE MEMPHIS LAw., Dec. 1999,
reprintedin 194 F.R.D. 262, 262, 265 (2000) (discussing the "disturbing trend" of the filing of
"delaying, questionable, or even frivolous pleadings and motions" in federal courts, where the
attorneys move for summary judgment and the court must review the record to find the disputed
facts).
70. See CARUTHERS, supra note 21, § 436, at 444 ("[I]t is a favorite and fundamental
principle that parties shall have their day in court."). But see Eskin v. Bartee, 262 S.W.3d 727,
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3. Byrd v. Hall and Its Progeny
The Tennessee Supreme Court fir st addressed the United States Supreme
Court's 1986 "summary judgment trilogy"7 in Byrd v. Hall. Unfortunately,
the Byrd court sent mixed messages. At one point in the opinion, the court
"embrace[d]" the trilogy .7 At a later point in the opinion, the court "place [d] a

finer point on the proper use of the summary judgment process",74 by rejecting
the "put up or shut up" rule of Celotex: "A conclusory assertion that the
nonmoving party has no evidence is clearly insufficient [to meet the moving
party's burden] ."
After articulating what kind of showing would be
insufficient to support a summary judgment motion, the court went on to
articulate what would suffice:
First, the moving party could affirmatively negate an essential element of the
nonimoving party's claim, i.e., a defendant in a negligence action would be
entitled to summary judgment if he convinced the court that he owed no duty
to the plaintiff. Second, the moving party could conclusively establish an
affirmative defense that defeats the nonoving party's claim, i.e., a defendant
would be entitled to summary judgment if he demonstrated that the
nonoving party cannot establish an essential element of his case.7
Despite its purported "embrace" of the 1986 trilogy, the Byrd court's rejection
of conclusory assertions and its enumeration of these two alternatives for
adequately supporting a summary judgment motion demonstrated its rejection
of the Celotex "put up or shut up" standard .7
732 (Tenn. 2008) ("Summary judgments are not disfavored as procedural devices."). There is an
intractable tension in Tennessee law between enthusiasm for summary judgment-expressed in
the 1971 Advisory Committee comments and Byrd's embrace of the 1986 trilogy-and
skepticism about it-expressed in the common law and Rule 56.03. This tension was exhibited
in Byrd itself. See Cornett, supra note 5, at 193 (noting that the supreme court implied that
summary judgment was both underused and overused). Summary judgment works well when it
is confined to cases presenting only legal issues, but summary judgment exposes judges to the
temptation of deciding disputed fact issues instead of deciding whether there are material fact
disputes. See infra text accompanying notes 152-53; see also Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv.
Cent., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 199 1); Robert L. Arrington, The Dirty Little Secret About
Summary Judgment, TENN. B.J., Sept.-Oct. 1976, at 12. The Hannan standard is the supreme
court's principled way of resolving this tension so as to balance enthusiasm with skepticism. See
infra text accompanying notes 223-27 (arguing that the standard also resolves tension between
justice and efficiency).
71. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
72. 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993).
73. Id.at 214.

74. Id.
75.
76.
77.

Idat215.
Id. at 215 n.5 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
The second of these alternatives was abandoned by the court in Hannan because it
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However, because the case before it did not require the application of
Celotex-that is, the sufficiency of the motion was not at issue-the court's
rejection of the "put up or shut up" standard could accurately be described as
dicta.78 In the years immediately following Byrd, the case was occasionally
cited erroneously to support the proposition that Tennessee follows the Celotex
standard. 79 However, in the almost fifteen years between Byrd and the trial
court's decision in Hannan, the Tennessee Court of Appeals generally
interpreted Byrd correctly as rejecting the "put up or shut up" standard. 80
was an illogical statement of the law. See Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 7 n.3
(Tenn. 2008) (quoting Cornett, supra note 5, at 189-90).
78. See generally June F. Entman, FlawedActivism: The Tennessee Supreme Court's
Advisory Opinions on Joint Tort Liability andSummary Judgment, 24 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 193,
206-23 (1994).
79. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 666 A.2d 146, 155 (N.J. 1995).
80. See Cornett, supra note 5, at 209-13. Byrd was often cited for certain bedrock
principles of summary judgment law, for example, the movant's burden of demonstrating his
entitlement to summary judgment; the standard to be used in assessing the movant's and
nonmovant's evidence; and the court's lack of power to grant summary judgment when the
evidence demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Holloway v. Evers, No.
M2006-01644-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4322128, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2007); In re
Estate of Cook, No. E2004-00293-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 3021131, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec.
30, 2004); El y. Figueroa, No. W2004-00617-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2848389, at *2-3 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2004); Jeffries v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 108 S.W.3d 862, 868-69 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2002); Calabro v. Calabro, 15 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Suddath v. Parks,
914 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
Byrd was rarely cited for the proposition that Tennessee had adopted the "put up or
shut up" standard of Celotex. My research assistants and I read every Tennessee case citing
Byrd or Celotex between 1993 and 2007. Byrd was cited in only a handful of cases as having
adopted the Celotex "put up or shut up" standard. See Judy M. Cornett, Table of Summary
Judgment Cases From 1993-2007 (on file with the Tennessee Law Review) [hereinafter Table
of Summary Judgment]; see, e.g., Blair v. Campbell, No. 02A01-9403-CV-00050, 1995 WL
77591, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 1995) (affirming summary judgment when motion made
conclusory assertion and nonmovant's affidavit did not address causation); Mullins v. Nash, No.
O1AO1-9403-CV-00138, 1994 WL 485581, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 1994) (granting
summary judgment because movant "demonstrate [d] that the nonmoving party cannot establish
an essential element of its case"); Bobo v. Harris, 1994 WL 71531, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb.
28, 1994) (quoting Celotex portion of Byrd but not applying it); Brenner v. Textron
Aerostructures, 874 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Celotex as quoted in Byrd);
Kan Const. & Cleaning Corp. v. Tatum, No. O1AO1-9304-CV-00150, 1993 WL 434741, at *5
(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1993) ("A motion for summary judgment can put the plaintiff s case to
the test. After a plaintiff has been given a reasonable opportunity to substantiate its claims, a
summary judgment may be entered if the plaintiff has failed to establish an essential element of
his case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial." (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986))); Masters ex rel Masters v. Rishton, No. 02A01-9207-CC-00210,
1993 WL 434798 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1993) (affirming summary judgment in a Celotex
lack of evidence case); Hill v. Hill, 1993 WL 312671, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1993)
(citing Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986), and other trilogy cases, but not
Byrd, in upholding summary judgment).
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After Byrd, whatever doubt remained about Tennessee's rejection of
Celotex should have been dissipated by the Tennessee Supreme Court's 1998
decision in McCarley v. West Quality Food Service.8 There, the supreme
court, speaking through now-Chief Justice Holder, clearly and unmistakably
articulated the burden imposed on movants by Tennessee's summary judgment
standard. 82 This time, the court's discussion of Celotex was not dicta. The
plaintiff in McCarley came down with food poisoning after eating Kentucky
Fried Chicken. 83 The defendant moved for summary judgment, pointing to the
treating physician's testimony that either the chicken or the bacon that
plaintiff had eaten for breakfast could have caused plaintiffs illness. 84In
response, the plaintiff pointed to the same doctor's testimony that chicken
"was at the top of the list."85 Faced with this near-equipoise in the evidence,
the trial court granted the summary judgment motion, and the court of appeals
affirmed on the ground that "the McCarleys could not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the chicken caused Mr. McCarley's
illness." 86
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant's
motion had not shifted the burden of production to the plaintiff because the
motion did not "negate the chicken from the list of possible causes." 87 The
doctor's testimony relied on by defendant simply cast doubt on whether the
chicken caused the food poisoning. 8The court held that because the burden of
production never shifted to the plaintiff, the courts below erred in holding that

81. 960 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1998).
82. See id. at 587-88. Even before McCarley, the court of appeals had often recognized
the burden-shifting required by Byrd. See, e.g., Cupp v. Dixie Cycle Sales, Inc., C.A.No.
OAO1-9410-CV-00492, 1995 WL 247965 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1995) (movant's affidavit
sufficient to shift burden; plaintiff s response insufficient to raise genuine issue); Williams v.
Williamson County Bd. of Educ., 890 S.W.2d 788 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (burden not shifted
because the movant did not properly support his motion); McCall v. Wilder, No. 03A01-9312CV-00455, 1994 WL 361848 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 11, 1994) (burden shifted but evidence
submitted by nonmovant insufficient); Damron v. Wilson, No. 01AO1-9310-CV-00448, 1994
WL 265790 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 1994) (in legal malpractice case, burden shifted by
movant attorney's own affidavit, and nonmovant's own lay affidavit insufficient response);
Sutherland v. Food Lion, Inc., No. OAO1-9309-CV-00414, 1994 WL 108889 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Mar. 30, 1994) (store employees' affidavits shifted burden to nonmovant); Johnson v.
Dickinson, No. 02A01-9304-CV-00083, 1993 WL 541032 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1993)
(filing of defendant attorney's affidavit shifted burden to plaintiff); Gray v. Amos, 869 S.W.2d
925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (burden not shifted as defendant failed to properly support his
motion).
83. McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 587.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 588.
88. Id.
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the plaintiff was required to produce evidence proving causation . 89 A movant
who fails to shift the burden to the nonmovant has failed to carry its burden of
demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is
entitled to judgment as a mailer of law. 90
As later commentators have recognized, the defendant in MeCarley could
have shifted the burden of production to the plaintiff by submitting an affidavit
from a physician, or eliciting testimony from the treating physician, that the
chicken did not cause the food poisoning. 9 1 This requirement distinguishes
Tennessee's summary judgment standard from the federal Celotex standard. In
federal summary judgment practice, the defendant's motion would almost
certainly have shifted the burden of production. The treating physician' s
inability to testify that the chicken caused the food poisoning would have
demonstrated that the plaintiff could not prove an essential element of its
case-causation in fact-and it would have been the plaintiffs burden to
produce evidence from which a reasonable juror could find causation in fact. 92
Thus, MeCarley clearly set Tennessee's summary judgment standard apart
from the federal standard. 93
The elegant burden-shifting analysis applied in MeCarley was reaffirmed
by the Tennessee Supreme Court in two later cases, Staples v. CBL &
Associates94 and Blair v. West Town Mall.95 In Staples, the plaintiff sued the
defendant mall management company for negligence after she was kidnapped

89. Id; accord FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee comment (1963) ("Where the
evidentiary mailer in support of the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine issue,
summary judgment must be denied, even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented"
(emphasis added)).
90. MeCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588. But see infra text accompanying notes 238-40
(suggesting that movant's initial burden is not equivalent to "demonstrating that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.")
91. Remarks by Chancellor Daryl Fansler, supra note 4.
92. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). This would be true if the plaintiff
were required to prove causation in fact with expert testimony. However, the MeCarley court
held that lay testimony is also relevant tn causatinn in fact. In an alternative holding in
MeCarley, the court addressed the sufficiency of the plaintiffs response to the motion.
MeCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 589. The response was sufficient, said the court, because the
physician's testimony that "chicken was at the top of the list," coupled with Mrs. McCarley's
testimony "that the chicken had an unusual odor, looked strange, and 'didn't taste right"' would
permit ajury to infer causation in fact. Id. In order to hold the plaintiffs response sufficient, the
court clarified the substantive law in food poisoning cases, holding that "causation ... can be
established by either expert testimony or through a combination of both expert and lay
testimony." Id. This interplay between the substantive law and the sufficiency of summary
judgment motions and responses will come into play again in Hannan.
93. See Cornett, supra note 5, at 206409 (In McCarley, the Tennessee Supreme Court
"reaffirmed the burden-shifting analysis adopted in Byrd, as well as Byrd's 'no conclusory
assertion' rule.").
94. 15 S.W.3d 83 (Tenn. 2000).
95. 130 S.W.3d 761 (Tenn. 2004).
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by another mall customer. 96Justice Drowota, the author of Byrd v. Hall, wrote
for the court.9 7 Reversing summary judgment for the defendant, the court cited
MeCarley:
To properly support its motion, the moving party must either affirmatively
negate an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or conclusively
establish an affimative defense. If the moving party fails to negate a claimed
basis for the suit, the non-moving party's burden to produce evidence
establishing the existence of a genuine issue for trial is not triggered and the
motion for summary judgment must fail. If the moving party successfully
negates a claimed basis for the action, the non-moving party may not simply
rest upon the pleadings, but must
offer proof to establish the existence of the
98
essential elements of the claim.
Although the court adopted the MeCarley standard, the court did not employ
MeCarley 's burden-shifting analysis. 9 9 The court did not explicitly address the
sufficiency of the defendant's motion; 100 instead, the court looked to both
parties' proffered evidence in holding that the mall owed a legal duty to its
customers and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
plaintiffs comparative fault. 101
In Blair v. West Town Mall, a premises liability case, Justice Drowota
again authored the court's opinion reversing summary judgment for the
defendant. 102 The court rested its holding squarely on the defendant's failure to
properly support its motion: "Because Defendant in this case failed to
affirmatively negate an essential element of Plaintiff s claim or conclusively
establish an affirmative defense, Plaintiffs burden to produce evidence
establishing the existence of a genuine issue for trial was not triggered." 103 The
defendant's motion rested on its contention that "Plaintiff had no evidence to
show that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous
condition." 104 Under the Celotex standard, this mere contention would have
been sufficient to shift the burden of production to the plaintiff. In Blair, the
defendant did support its motion by relying on portions of the plaintiffs
deposition testimony. 10 5 However, as the court noted, "Defendant did not file
96.
97.

98.
99.

Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 83.
Id at 85.
Id at 88-89 (citations omitted).
Idat89-92.
Id
Id; see also Mills v. CSX Transp., ic., 300 S.W.3d 627,632 (Tenn. 2009); infra note

100.
101.
241.
102. 130 S.W.3d 761, 762 (Tenn. 2004).
103. Id
104. Id at 763.
105. Id. The plaintiff testified that "she did not know how long the substance had been
there, where it came from, or if anyone at the mall knew it was there, and... she did not know
if anyone at the mall had an opportunity to do anything about the substance prior to the
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an affidavit in support of the motion or present any other evidence." 106 The
defendant explicitly argued on appeal that it was not required to
C6'affirmatively negate' an element of Plaintiff s claim in order for Plaintiff to
have the burden of producing some proof on the element, and [that] it is
enough for the Defendant to demonstrate that Plaintiff has not produced any
evidence on that element." 107 In essence, the defendant was arguing that the
Celotex "put up or shut up" standard should apply.
The supreme court rejected the defendant's argument. Citing both Staples
and MeCarley, the court stated, "Defendant overlooks Tennessee case law that
makes clear what burden is placed on each party in a motion for summary
judgment." 108 Noting that the case before it was "similar" to MeCarley, the
Blaircourt explained why the plaintiff s deposition testimony was insufficient
to support the motion: "[W]hile this evidence casts doubt on Plaintiff s ability
to prove at trial whether Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the
dangerous condition . ... it does not negate the element of notice. The
deposition testimony does not prove that Defendant did not have actual or
constructive notice." 109
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the defendant explicitly argued
that Byrd v. Hall required affirmance of the summary judgment. 110 The
defendant noted Judge Goddard's opinion from the court of appeals that "'.if
the evidence remains substantially the same as in the present record, [the
defendant] might well be entitled to a directed verdict." 1 " Under the Celotex
standard, if the movant would be entitled to a directed verdict on the evidence
produced at the summary judgment stage, the movant is entitled to summary
judgment. 112 The defendant in Blair was arguing that Byrd v. Hall required the
same result. 113 Again, speaking on behalf of the court, the author of Byrd
rejected this interpretation:
,

Byrd does not support this position. In Byrd we stated that the two motions
"should be considered in the same maner .... i.e., the trial court must take
the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party,
allow all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard all
countervailing evidence." The point being made was that the trial court
shuld view the evidence in favor of the nontmoving party in both instances,
,

accident." Id.

106.
107.

Id
Id at 767.

Id
Id at 768. Note the eerie foreshadowing of Hannan here: the plaintiffs lack of
knowledge of an element does not negate the element. See also Mills v. CSX Transp., Inc., 300
108.

109.

S.W.3d 627, 633 (Tenn. 2009) (plaintiff s lack of knowledge of precise condition on stairway
where he fell did not negate the element of causation).
110. Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 768.
I111. Id.
112. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
113. Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 768.
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not that any case which results114in a directed verdict should have been
resolved by summary judgment.
This interpretation of Byrd by its author is unmnistakable, but both the parties in
Hannan and post-Hannan commentators have ignored this authoritative
interpretation of Byrd and have drawn an unbroken arc between Byrd and
Hannan that does not account for the intervening Tennessee Supreme Court
115
decisions in MeCarley, Blair, and Staples.
111. HANNAN v. ALLTEL PUBLISHING Co. 116
The Hannan117 decision came down on Halloween, an appropriate date
because it is a spooky case in several ways: the facts are spooky, the court of
appeals' suggestion of supreme court review was spooky, and the supreme
court's decision has spooked many members of the bench and bar across
Tennessee. The plaintiffs, Michael and Elizabeth Hannan, owned a realty
company and a bed and breakfast in Tellico Plains. 118 For several years, they
had taken out ads in the saffron-colored pages of defendant Alltel's telephone
directory; but for some reason, in 2003, Alltel failed to print their ads. 1 19 The
Hannans sued Alltel, claiming that the omission of their ads constituted
12 1
negligence and resulted in lost profits. 12 0 They sought $225,000 in damages.
Lost profits are spooky for defendants because they seem so speculative.12
Alltel deposed the Hannans, questioning them about their 2003 and 2004
income tax returns, which actually showed an increase in gross receipts in the
114. Id. (citation omitted).
115. See, e.g., Application for Permission to Appeal at 9-12, Hannan v. Alitel Publ'g Co.,
270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008) (No. E-2006-01353-SC-RIl-CV); Amy M. Pepke, Prove It:
Findingthe Middle Groundin Tennessee's Evolving Summary JudgmentStandard,TENN. B.J.,
July 2007, at 12, 13; see also Prince Chambliss, Summary Judgment in Tennessee: Yesterday,
Today, and Tomorrow (Dec. 23, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Tennessee
Law Review); Remarks by Chancellor Daryl Fansler, supra note 4.
116. Portions of this section appeared in an earlier article: Judy M. Cornett, Byrd Still Has
Wings: The Tennessee Supreme Court Reaffirms Its Summary Judgment Standardin Hannan v.
Alltel Publishing Co., DICTA, Mar. 2009, at 12.
117. Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008).
118. Id. at 3.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See generally Robert M. Lloyd, Proving Lost Profits after Daubert: Five Questions
Every Court ShouldAsk Before Admitting Expert Testimony, 41 U. RICH. L. REv. 379 (2007)
(discussing how trial courts should determine whether to admit expert testimony on lost profits);
Robert M. Lloyd, Contract Damages in Tennessee, 69 TENN. L. REv. 837, 876-82 (2002)
(outlining the principles governing contract damages and expert testimony in Tennessee); J.
Ross Pepper, RecoveringLost Profits, TE-NN. B.J., Aug. 2008, at 14 (discussing the allowance of
lost profits in Tennessee).
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year in which their ads did not appear. 123 The plaintiffs were unable to explain
this increase. 124 They were also unable to testify to the amount of their lost
profits due to the omitted ad, and they failed to provide documentary evidence
showing any calculation of lost profits. 125 Indeed, the following deposition
testimony of the plaintiffs, Michael and Elizabeth Hannan, takes on a
nightmarish quality for defense attorneys:

Q [to Michael Hannan]

Would you agree with me that your gross receipts
were up significantly in the year that your business was not listed as
compared to the previous year when you were listed?

A

That our gross sales were-

Q Significantly higher in the year that you weren't listed as compared to the
year you were listed?

A

If you are asking me to compare those two lines, yes.

Q And you told me you cannot give an explanation for that?
A Other than the fact that we may have sold a piece of our own property, I
don't know. We may have had to start to liquidate by then. 126

Q Do you know why or do you have an explanation for why in the year
preceding the failure to list you had such a low net profit of only $2,000,
$1,949?

A I still can't tell you. I couldn't tell you earlier; I can't tell you now. I don't
know how this stuff works. I presume, it's possible that we could have paid a

123.
124.
125.
126.

Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 4.
Id.
Id
Id
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debt or something; I don't know. We could have lowered the amount127
of
money we owed on a piece of land for instance. I don't know the answer.

Q [to Elizabeth Hannan]

Your husband responded to my questions about
quantifying in dollars the amount of loss or documentation which would
reflect the amount of loss for these omissions that we're here about. Do you
have any way of doing that?
A I have absolutely no way of doing that. And neither does anyone else.

128

This evidence is frustrating for obvious reasons. The plaintiffs' gross sales
129
went up in the year that the defendant did not list them in the directory.
They cannot put a dollar figure on the amount of lost profits they suffered, and
furthermore, according to Elizabeth Hannan "neither [can] anyone else ."3
Arguably, this evidence undermines their claim of lost profits: how can they
say they lost profits when their gross sales went up? The plaintiffs' inability to
quantify their damages leaves the defendant in a quandary: if the plaintiffs
don't know how much they lost, how can the defendant be expected to dispute
it? The evidence in Hannan appeared to present a classic case in which the
party having the ultimate burden of proof lacked evidence at the discovery
phase of an essential element of its case, damages.
Alltel moved for summary judgment, pointing to the income tax returns
and the plaintiffs' deposition testimony to demonstrate two distinct points:
first, that "the Hannans ' [would be] unable to prove they suffered any damages
as a result of Alltel's alleged breach of contract"'; 13 1 and second, that "the
Hannans [would be unable to] prove the amount of damages sustained as a
result of the omitted advertisement. 132 In response, the plaintiffs produced no
additional evidence, merely stating that they would "establish damages by

proof at trial.",133 This strategy was spooky because it was so risky. 14By
127. Id. at4n.l1.
128. Id. at 4. Notice the echoes here of the plaintiff s deposition testimony in Blair v. W
Town Mall. See Blair v. W. Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 762-63 (Tenn. 2004).
129. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 3.
130. Id. at 4.
131. Idat3.
132. Idat4n.l1.
133. Id. at 4.
134. See Notes by Judy Cornett from Presentation by Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.,
Tennessee Court of Appeals, Summary Judgment in Tennessee, at Home Run CLE, presented
by University of Tennessee College of Law (June 20, 2009) (on file with the Tennessee Law
Review) [hereinafter Presentation by Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.]. Judge Susano termed this
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failing to produce evidence in response to the motion, the plaintiffs rolled the
dice that Alltel's motion had not triggered their burden of production. The trial
court disagreed and granted summary judgment. 135
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge
Susano, reversed the summary judgment. 136 The court held that the Hannans'
burden of production had never been triggered because "Alltel ha[d] failed to
negate an essential element of the plaintiff s claim, i.e., that the plaintiffs were
damaged as a proximate result of Alltel's failure to publish their
advertisement."1 3 The court of appeals' opinion is worthy of study because
Judge Susano cogently discussed the development of Tennessee's summary
judgment standard from Byrd through McCarley and Blair, clearly
demonstrating that Tennessee's standard has always differed from the federal
standard. 138
After correctly summarizing Tennessee summary judgment jurisprudence,
Judge Susano noted one apparently conflicting Court of Appeals casel39
Denton v. Hahn, authored by then-Judge Koch. In Denton, over the dissent
of Judge Cottrell, the court of appeals' majority surprisingly suggested that in
Tennessee "[a] moving party may satisfy its initial burden of production ... by
demonstrating that the nonmoving party's evidence itself is insufficient to
establish an essential element of its claim."1 4 1 In this respect, the Denton case
was uncharacteristic because the court of appeals had had no problem correctly
applying the Byrd standard between 1993 and 2004.142
The vast majority of summary judgment cases decided by the appellate
courts between 1993 and 2007 fall into one of two categories: (1) cases in
which the facts were undisputed and the only issue was one of law, 14 3 or (2)
failure to respond a "gutsy" move. Id.
135. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 4-5.
136. Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., No. E2006-01353-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 208430, at *8
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan 26, 2007).
137. Id. at *6.
138. See id. at *3-7 (citing Blair v. W. Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761 (Tenn. 2004);
McCarley v. W. Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1998); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d
208 (Tenn. 1993)).
139. Hannan, 2007 WL 208430, at *6.
140. Denton v. Hahn, No. M2003-00342-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2083711, at *1 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2004) (no application for permission to appeal filed).
141. Id.at*ll.
142. My research assistants and I have read every case citing Celotex or Byrd decided by
the Tennessee Court of Appeals between 1993 and 2007; in only a handful of cases did the
court mischaracterize Tennessee's standard as being identical to the federal standard, and these
cases were decided largely before the McCarley decision in 1998. See supra note 80 (listing
cases where the court mischaracterized Tennessee's standard).
143. See, e.g., Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 427-28 (Tenn. 1994) (whether
drug company/physician/pharmacist had duty to warn of drug dangers); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Torpoco, 879 S.W.2d 831, 832-33 (Tenn. 1994) (construction of medical
malpractice insurance policy); Honeycutt v. Wilkes, McCullough, & Wagner, No. W2007-
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cases in which a properly supported summary judgment motion shifted the
burden of responding, and the nonmovant's response created a genuine issue
of material fact. 144 The first type of case-those involving pure questions of
00185-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2200285 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2,2007) (when legal malpractice
cause accrued); Zamek v. O'Donnell, No. W2006-00522-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 98481, at
* 10-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2007) (decision not to re-stripe road was discretionary function
under Governmental Tort Liability Act); Penn-Star Ins. Co. v. Willis, No. M2005-00899-COAR3-CV, 2006 WL 2105993 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2006) (construction of insurance policy
and application of concurrent causation doctrine); Lawrence v. Trees N Trends, No. E200501365-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 3406366 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2005) (store employees'
conduct not outrageous as a matter of law); Thomas v. Pitts, No. 03A01-9410-CV-00362, 1995
WL 702711, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1995) (when medical malpractice cause of action
accrued); Jones v. City of Johnson City, 917 S.W.2d 687, 688-89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)
(whether city had constructive notice sufficient to remove GTLA immunity); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dotson, No. 02A01-9407-CV-00166, 1995 WL 548784, at * 1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Sept. 18, 1995) (construction of automobile insurance policy); Suddath v. Parks, 914 S.W.2d
910, 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (whether employer owed a duty to warn employee that bull
might attack); West v. Wilson, No. 03A01-9409-CH-00348, 1995 WL 96796, at *5-6 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1995) (effect of statute extinguishing mineral rights); Wallace v. Nat'l Bank of
Commerce, No. 02A01-9404-CV-00072, 1995 WL 30597, at * 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1995)
(legal effect of plaintiffs' agreement to bank card via signature card); Mapco Petroleum, Inc. v.
Huddleston, No. 01A01-9404-CH-00151, 1994 WL 695403, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9,
1994) (whether case was filed within statute of limitations); Coley v. A-Best Co., 1994 WL
399561, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1994) (when statute of limitations began to run in
asbestos case); Wilkins v. Third Nat'1Bank, 884 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (when
cause of action accrued for statute of limitations purposes); Hubbard v. Hardeman County Bank,
868 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (whether movable buildings are realty or
personalty); Capshaw v. City of Cookeville, No. 01-A-9209-CH00359, 1993 WL 122060, at
*2-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 1993) (whether deed created a fee simple absolute); Rogers v.
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tenn., No. 03A01-9211-CV-00418, 1993 WL 86938, at *1 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1993) (whether medical insurance policy excluded condition).
144. See, e.g., Kersey v. Jones, No. M2006-01321-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2198329
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2007) (disputed issue of fact whether plaintiff was denied access to
public records); Simpson v. Doe, No. E2005-01699-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 1627292 (Tenn.
Ct. App, June 13, 2006) (in subrogation action, disputed issue of fact whether plaintiff had been
made whole by settlement); Holt v. Alexander, No. W2003-02541-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL
94370 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2005) (disputed issue of fact whether physician made
misrepresentation of fact that voided signed consent form); McIntosh v. Blanton, 164 S.W.3d
584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (issue of fact about when medical malpractice plaintiff learned that
injury was caused by surgeon's negligence); Collins v. Greene County Bank, 916 S.W.2d 941,
945 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (summary judgment inappropriate on tort of interference with
business relationship); Keene v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, No. 01-A-01-9505CV00211, 1995 WL 623070, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1995) (whether previous injury
caused second fall); Brannon v. Pyle, No. 03A01-9506-CV-00199, 1995 WL 571885, at *3
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1995) (whether there was probable cause in suit for malicious
prosecution); B&L Corp. v. Thomas & Thorgreen, Inc., 917 S.W.2d 674, 679 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1995) (whether employee competed with employer prior to termination); Permanent Gen.
Assurance Corp. v. Runions, No. 01-A-01-9502-CV-00071, 1995 WL 481461, at*1 (Tenn. Ct.
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law on undisputed facts-are quintessentially appropriate for summar
judgment and are descendants of the "Agreed Case" at common law. 5
Characteristic cases include those requiring the court to determine when a
cause of action accrued for statute of limitations purposes.146 Contract
construction cases are also well-represented in this category. 14 7 Other purely
legal issues found in this category are whether moveable buildings are realty
or personalty, 14 8 whether the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff, 14 9 and
whether a city had constructive notice sufficient to remove Government Tort
Liability Act (GTLA) immunity. 150 As then-Judge Koch stated in one opinion,
"Summar judgments are particularly suited for disposing of purely legal
issues.
Appellate reversals of summary judgment seemed to cluster in the second
type of case-those in which the nonmovant's response reveals a genuine
issue of material fact. 152 The number of appellate reversals of summary
App. Aug. 16, 1995) (whether brother had insured's permission to drive car); First Tenn. Bank
v. Davis, No. 03A01-9502-CH-00070, 1995 WL 434661, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 1995)
(whether the purpose of loan was business or personal); Roberts v. Scholl, Inc., No. 03A019410-CV-00370, 1995 WL 424665, at * 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 1995) (whether plaintiff s
discharge was due to filing worker's compensation case); Pac. Props. v. Home Fed. Bank, No.
03A01-9410-CH-00393, 1995 WL 59112, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1995) (summary
judgment on basis of statute of limitations inappropriate when there is a genuine issue regarding
when plaintiff knew of conversion); Baker v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 03A01-9312-CV-00431,
1994 WL 283858, at * 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 1994) (summary judgment inappropriate when
there was an issue as to how much briefcase weighed and whether flight attendant stowed it).
145. See supratext accompanying notes 32-38 (discussing the "agreed case"). Of course,
not all the cases in this category involve the parties' explicit agreement that the facts are
undisputed. More commonly, the factual agreement becomes evident through the court's close
perusal of the pleadings and motion filings. However, a few ofthe cases do involve submissions
on stipulated facts. See, e.g., West, 1995 WL 96796, at *5.
146. See, e.g., Honeycutt, 2007 WL 2200285, at *4; Thomas, 1995 WL 702711, at *1;
Huddleston, 1994 WL 695403, at *1; Coley, 1994 WL 399561, at *2; Wilkins, 884 S.W.2d at
760.
147.

See, e.g., Keller v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., No. E2006-00610-COA-R9-CV, 2006

WL 2855095 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2006) (construction of life insurance policy) (also
illustrating rare interlocutory appeal of summary judgment denial); Dotson, 1995 WL 548784,
at * 1 (construction of automobile insurance policy); Torpoco, 879 S.W.2d at 832 (construction
of malpractice insurance contract); Van Dyke v. Harsco Co., No. 01-A-01-9401-ChOO002, 1994
WL 228738, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 1994) (construction of employment severance
contract); Rogers, 1993 WL 86938, at *1 (construction of medical insurance policy).
148. Hubbard,868 S.W.2d at 657.
149. Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tenn. 1994) (whether drug
company/physician/pharmacist had duty to warn of drug dangers).
150. Jones v. City of Johnson City, 917 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
151. Griswold v. Income Props., II, a Ltd. P'ship, No. 01A01-9310-CH-00469, 1995 WL
256756, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 1995).
152. See, e.g., Keene v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., No. 01-A-01-9505CV00211, 1995 WL 623070, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1995) (reversing trial court finding
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judgment in this category suggests that trial judges are less adept than
appellate judges at recognizing genuine issues of material fact, perhaps
because they are swayed by the understandable desire to clear their dockets or
because they are overcome by the human, but legally impermissible, tendency
153
to weigh the competing evidence.
In fact, however, appellate reversals of summary judgments are relatively
rare. My survey of the post-Byrd, pre-Hannan cases shows that summary

judgments were affirmed on appeal nearly 70% of the time. 14And this
percentage was remarkably consistent over the years; there was no decline in
summary judgment affirmances after the decisions in MeCarley, Staples, or
Blair. What is the significance of these statistics? First, this data demonstrates
that Tennessee's summary judgment standard was working well when Hannan
went up on appeal. Trial judges were granting summary judgments and
appellate courts were reviewing these decisions carefully and, by and large,
correctly. 155

A party who was granted summary judgment in the trial court had

almost a seven in ten chance of having that disposition affirmed on appeal. 156
Here, although I do not compare the percentage of summary judgments
affirmed by federal appeals courts or by appellate courts in states that have
adopted the Celotex standard, 157 an affirmance rate of nearly 70%, in absolute
that there was no genuine issue of material fact); B&L Corp. v. Thomas & Thorgreen, Inc., 917
S.W.2d 674, 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing trial court finding that there was no genuine
issue of material fact).

153.

See, e.g., Martin v.

Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 271 S.W.3d 76, 87 (Tenn. 2008); Arrington,

supra note 70.
154. The exact percentage of affirmances was 69.540o. This figure is not precise, however,
because of two factors. First, we counted both dispositions in dual-disposition cases. Therefore,
a case decided by both the court of appeals and the supreme court was counted twice. Second, a
summary judgment that was affirmed in part and reversed in part was not counted. See Table of
Summary Judgment, supra note 80.
155. By "correctly" I mean "applying the correct standard and reaching a plausible result."
156. See Table of Summary Judgment, supra note 80.
157. Of course, this data has other limitations. First, it is impossible to tell in what
percentage of cases mntions for summary judgment are filed. The Tennessee Administrative
Office of the Courts maintains statistics compiled by court clerks on case dispositions, which
are reported in the Annual Reports of the Tennessee Judiciary, but they keep track of pretrial
dispositions only in the aggregate, failing to differentiate among motions to dismiss, summary
judgment motions, voluntary dismissals, and agreed dismissals. See TENNESSEE
ADMNSTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TENNESSEE JU'DICLARY FISCAL

YEAR
2007-2008,
available
at
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/geninfo/Publications/A-nnualReport/2007-2008/2007O80/o20annual /o20report /o20statistics.pdf. Second, it is impossible to know how Tennessee's
rejection of Celotex has affected attorneys' willingness to file summary judgment motions in
cases that would be appropriate for summary disposition under Celotex. Presumably, an
attorney's compliance with Rule 11I of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure would prohibit
him or her from filing a pure Celotex motion unless he or she wished to argue for a change in
Tennessee law. Congruent with this observation, perhaps, is the fact that these data reveal a
very small percentage of cases in which the Celotex standard is implicated at all. See cases cited
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terms, suggests that rejection of the Celotex standard has not impaired the
158
useflulness of summary judgment in Tennessee.
There are a handfuil of early post-Byrd cases in which the courts cite or
quote the crucial portion of Celotex-' the nonmoving party cannot establish
an essential element of his/her case" 15 9-but in only two cases did the court of
appeals actually apply this principle. 160 These cases are counterbalanced by a
infra note 160. Thus, if Tennessee's rejection of Celotex makes much of a difference, that
difference occurs at the pretrial stage by deterring attorneys from filing Celotex motions, not at
the appellate stage.
Related to these shortcomings is the fact that this data do not reveal the frequency or
validity of denials of summary judgment at the trial court level. Unless an interlocutory appeal
is granted, denials of summary judgment remain virtually impervious to appellate review. Table
of Summary Judgment, supranote 80. Because a denied summary judgment motion will almost
always result in either a settlement or a trial, appellate review in these cases will focus on the
disposition of motions for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (TNOV).
Therefore, if Tennessee's summary judgment standard is resulting in an inordinate number of
denials of summary judgment, that effect cannot be reflected in this data. Similarly, this data
cannot reflect trial court grants or denials of summary judgment in cases that are never appealed
at all.
What we do know, however, is that Tennessee courts do not see an inordinate number
of trials. The Annual Reports of the Tennessee Judiciary reflect the national trend toward "the
vanishing trial." Patricia Lee Refo, Opening Statement: The Vanishing Trial, 30 LITIGATION
ONLIN 1, http://www.abanet.org/litigationjoumnal/opening statements/04winter openingstate
ment.pdf (discussing the ABA's "Vanishing Trial Project" and how trials are decreasingly
used); see also ANNUAL REPORT OF THIE TENNESSEE JuDiciARY, supra. We can conclude from the
low percentage of trials in Tennessee that if an inordinate number of summary judgment denials
are occurring, the result is not more trials, but perhaps more settlements.
Finally, I have not attempted a comparative analysis of the affirmance rate for civil
cases disposed of other than by summary judgment.
158. From a plaintiff's perspective, of course, the 70%orate may reflect undue deference by
the appellate courts to trial courts that have granted summary judgment. From this perspective,
there are surely more than three in ten summary judgments that should not have been granted,
either because the trial court was wrong about the law or because it overlooked a genuine issue
nfmaterial fact. Also, frnm this perspective, Hannan may lnnk like a necessary reminder tn the
intermediate appellate courts that they should closely scrutinize grants of summanry judgment for
compliance with Tennessee's standard.
159. Blair v. Campbell, No. 2A01-9403-CV-00050, 1995 WL 77591, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Feb. 27, 1995); see, e.g., Peak v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. M2001-03047-COA-R3-CV, 2002
WL 31890892, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 31,2002); Robertson v. George, No. M2000-0266 1COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1173270, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5,2001); Mears v. H.J. Heinz Co.,
No. 02A01-9403-CV-00058, 1995 WL 37344, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1995); Bobo v.
Harris, 1994 WL 7153 1, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1994).
160. Kan Const. & Cleaning Corp. v. Tatum, No. 01A01-9304-CV-00150, 1993 WL
434741, at *5- (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1993); Masters ex relMasters v. Rishton, No. 02A019207-CC-002 10, 1993 WL 434798, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1993); see also Holtv. Pyles,
No. M2005-02092-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1217264, at * 11-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2007)
(Cottrell, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with summary judgment on estoppel issue because
majority did not require movant to negate reliance).

330

330

~TENNESSEE
LA W RE VIEW

[o.7:077:305
[Vol.

handfiul of early cases in which the courts read Byrd correctly as rejecting pure
Celotex motions. 161 In fact, very early on, then-Judge Koch, the dissenter in
Hannan, understood Byrd as follows:
Because the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating that there is no disputed material issue of fact, it is insufficient
for the moving party merely to state that there is no evidence. Wvhen the
moving party properly supports its motion, the non-movant must submit facts
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. 162
In cases correctly applying Byrd, the court of appeals addressed the issue
of whether the summary judgment motion was sufficient to trigger the
nonmovant's burden of responding. 13Sometimes the burden was not
triggered. 164 Sometimes the burden was triggered and the nonovant failed to
respond at all. 15Sometimes the burden was triggered but the nonovant's
response was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, 166 resulting
in affirmance of the summary judgment.
Thus, in the overall body of summary judgment jurisprudence in the
167
Tennessee Court of Appeals, Denton appeared to be an outlier.
161. See, e.g., Cate v. Samsonite Furniture Co., No. 03A01-9406-CV-00228, 1994 WL
706620, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1994); Mifsud v. Dominion Bank of Middle Tenn., 1993
WL 477012, at * 11I(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1993). In a case very similar to Hannan, the court
of appeals reversed a summary judgment for defendant on a libel claim. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v.
Whittle, 1993 WL 410021, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 1993).The defendant pointed out that
the plaintiffs' tax returns showed no diminution in income after the alleged libel, and the
plaintiffs' affidavits alleged only damages to their reputation and standing in the community. Id.
The court held that these statements by the plaintiffs were sufficient to raise a material issue of
damages because special damages or out-of-pocket damages were not required by the law of
libel. Id.
162. Frazee v. Med Ctr. Inns of Am., Inc., No. OlAO1-9301-CV-00034, 1993 WL 312674,
at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1993) (citation omitted).
163. See cases cited infra notes 164-66.
164. E.g., Williams v. Williamsnn Cnunty Bd. of~duc., 890 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1994); Gray v. Amos, 869 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
165. E.g., Exchequer 1982-1 Oil & Gas Drilling P'ship v. Miller, No. O1AOl-9502-CH00072, 1995 WL 763832, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1995) (holding that nonmovant could
not rely on complaint but should have responded with sworn documents); Johnson v. Dickinson,
No. 02A01-9304-CV-00083, 1993 WL 541032, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1993) (plaintiff
relied on his pleadings instead of presenting expert affidavit); Gable v. City of Athens Dep't of
Police, 1993 WL 268886, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 1993) (no response filed to motion for
summary judgment).
166. E.g., Warren v. Estate of Kirk, No. 02A019408CV00197, 1995 WL 546886, at * 1-2
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 1995) (affidavits in opposition to motion insufficient to show agency
relationship at time of wreck); Byrd v. Bradley, 913 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (in
suit for wrongful calculation of parole date, prisoner "did not point out with sufficient
specificity what part of the affiant's calculation he disagreed with").
167. Pepke, supra note 115, at 13 (The Denton majority "[threw] off the weighty mantle
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Nevertheless, in Hannan, the court of appeals "encourage[d] the Tennessee
Supreme Court to address (1) the issue of exactly what is meant by 'negating'
an element of a plaintiff s claim, and (2) whether Tennessee follows the Sixth
Circuit's 'put up or shut up' interpretation of Celotex." 168 This was a spooky
move for a couple of reasons. First, the conflict in the court of appeals was
really an illusion; the need for clarification of Tennessee's summary judgment
standard was not self-evident. Second, asking the supreme court to review its
long-established standard ran the risk of muddying the waters, rather than
clarifying the standard.
Of course, it was possible that the supreme court would choose to overrule
Byrd, MeCarley, and their progeny and adopt the federal Celotex standard. The
bad facts of Hannan certainly presented an ideal case in which to do so
because they illustrated the frustrations engendered by Tennessee's
standard 1.
Indeed, given Judge Susano's clear understanding of the
Tennessee summary judgment standard and the illusory nature of the conflict
cited in the court of appeals' opinion, it was hard to imagine why the court
would call for supreme court review unless it believed that adoption of the
Celotex standard would be desirable.
Perhaps in light of the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the court
of appeals believed that the supreme court needed to once again emphasize the
correct summary judgment standard in order to provide guidance to the trial
courts. 170

Or perhaps, in light of the Denton court's erroneous statement of the

summary judgment standard, the eastern section court of appeals believed that
a further statement from the supreme court was necessary to remind all judges
of the intermediate appellate court of the correct standard. This rationale,
however, seems a bit far-fetched in view of the fact that only a handful of
court of appeals cases misapp~lied the summary judgment standard in the years
between Byrd and Hannan.17
Whatever the court of appeals' rationale for encouraging supreme court
review, the supreme court agreed that Hannan should be reviewed. 172
Byrd created.").
1 68.

Hannan v. Alitel Puhl'g Co., No. F2006-O1 353-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WI. 208430, at *8

(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2007).
169. See Pepke, supra note 115, at 13. Many members of Tennessee's bench and bar would
probably agree with Pepke's characterization of the denial of summary judgment on the facts of
Hannan as "preposterous." 1d; accord Chambliss, supra note 115, at 10 ("[G]iven the facts in

Hannan, it is difficult to think of a more compelling case for granting

summary judgment.");

Notes by Judy Cornett from presentation by Judge Wheeler Rosenbalm, Knox County Circuit
Court, Circuit Court Practice, (June 12, 2009) (on file with the Tennessee Law Review)
[hereinafter Presentation by Judge Wheeler Rosenbalm].
170. However, my research demonstrates that summary judgments granted by Tennessee
trial courts between 1993 and 2007 were affirmed by the court of appeals on an average of 7000
per year, indicating that the trial courts are not going far astray in granting summary judgment.
See Table of Summary Judgment, supra note 80.
171. See cases cited supra note 80.
172. Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008).
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Interestingly, by the time the court heard argument in Hannan, Justice Koch,
173
the author of the conflicting Denton decision, had joined the supreme court .
Therefore, briefing and argument in Hannan took place before a court that
included the judge who had authored the opinion advocating the competing
view of Tennessee's summary judgment standard. 17 4 Surely this was eerie for
the advocates, who had to explain to the entire supreme court why they should
either accept or reject the view publicly espoused by one particular member of

the court.17
Surprisingly, however, given the open door provided by the supreme
court's grant of permission to ap eal, the appellant Ailtel did not ask the court
to overrule Byrd and MeCarley. 76Instead, the appellant asked only that the
Tennessee Supreme Court "clarify that the moving party's requirement to
negate an element of plaintiffs' claim in a summary judgment motion does not
require the moving party to prove a nepative by providing evidence on a fact
that it would not have to prove at trial.",7 Similarly, when appellant's counsel
was asked directly at oral argument whether appellant's position would require
the court to overrule MeCarley, appellant's counsel replied that it would
not. 178 Perhaps the appellant weakened its case by refusing to acknowledge the
reality of Tennessee's summary judgment standard. In its brief, the appellant
stated that "Tennessee appears to have digressed from the federal
[standard] , 7 suggesting that the correct arc of Tennessee's summary
judgment jurisprudence went from Celotex to Byrd to Denton-completely
ignoring the McCarley-Staples-Blair line of supreme court cases-and
asserting that Denton represented a typical view of summary judgment by the
court of appeals rather than an outlier case. 180 Reviewing the MeCarley173. Id at 1.
174. Id.; Denton v. Hahn, No. M2003-00342-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2083711, at *1
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2004) (no application for permission to appeal filed).
175. The same dynamic is in place in a case currently pending before the Tennessee
Supreme Court, Gossett v. TractorSupply Co., No. M2007-02530-COA-R3 -CV (Tenn. argued
Feb. 11, 2010). In an eerie echo of Hannan, the court of appeals in Gossett recommended
supreme court review in this wrongful discharge case largely on the hasis of a conflicting
opinion of the court of appeals authored by then-Judge Koch. Id. at *4, * 15 (discussing Collins
v. AmSouth Bank, 241 S.W.3d 879 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)).
176. See Brief of Appellant Alitel Publishing Co. at 17, Hannan v. Ailtel Publ'g, Co., 270
S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008) (No. E2006-01353-SC-RI11-CV).
177. Id at 1.At oral argument, appellant's counsel refined its position by stating that it was
asking for an exception to the McCarley standard only in cases where the nonmovant is in
exclusive control of the evidence needed to prove the challenged element. Audio Recording of
Oral Argument, Hannan, 270 S.W.3d 1 (No. E2006-01353-SC-Rl l-CV) (on file with the
Tennessee Law Review).
178. Audio Recording of Oral Argument, supra note 177.
179. Brief of Appellant Alltel Publishing, supra note 176, at 16 (emphasis added).
180. Id. at 23. Indeed, in seeking permission to appeal, Alltel argued that a split of
authority on the current summary judgment standard existed in the court of appeals. Application
for Permission to Appeal at 7-9, Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008) (No.
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Staples-Blair line of cases, the appellant admitted that "the Supreme Court
has, in fact, moved away from the federal analysis that it earlier had
adopted,"181 elevating the Byrd court's stated "embrace" of Celotex into a
182
holding, and ignoring Justice Drowota's interpretation of Byrd in Blair.
Given the appellant's refusal to directly confront the disparity between the
Tennessee and federal summary judgment standards, and especially its failure
to recognize that this disparity reflected a considered choice by the Tennessee
Supreme Court over at least a ten-year period, it is not surprising that the
supreme court's first question to appellant's counsel at oral argument was
1 83
"What about MeCarley don't you understand?"
Ultimately, in its 4-1 decision in Hannan, the Supreme Court stuck to its
guns and reaffirmed the Byrd-MeCarley-Blairstandard. 184 For the first time,
the court explicitly recognized that Tennessee's standard differs from the
federal standard: "[J]n Byrd, despite language suggesting the contrary, we
began our departure from the federal standard and continued that departure in
MeCarley, and in subsequent cases." 185 The court left the existing standard
unchanged, with one small exception. 16Speaking through Chief Justice
Holder, the author of the opinion in MeCarley, the court held that the movant
who does not bear the burden of proof at trial can shift the burden of
production to the nonmovant in two ways. 17The first way, unchanged since
Byrd, is to "affirmatively negate an essential element of the nonoving party's
claim." 188 The second way, which is new-or at least newly articulated-is to
"show that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim
at trial." 189 In the Byrd-McCarley-Blairline of cases, this alternative way of
shifting the burden was described as follows: "[T]he moving party could
conclusively establish an affirmative defense that defeats the nonmoving
party's claim." 190 Comparing these two statements, one easily sees that the
Byrd formulation applies only to movants who bear the burden of proof at
trial; therefore, in describing the burden of movants who do not bear the
burden of proof at trial, the Hannan court correctly modified this second
method. 191
F-2006-O1 353-SC-RI11-CV). However, Alitel cited only Dlenton v. Hahn for this proposition.

Id.
181. Brief of Appellant Alitel Publishing, supra note 176, at 29 (emphasis added).
182. Id at 30.
183. Audio Recording of Oral Argument supra note 177.
184. Hannan v. Alitel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 2-3 (Tenn. 2008).
185. Id. at 7. Summarizing its review of cases from ByrdthroughBlair, the supreme court
concluded, "These cases clearly show that a moving party's burden of production in Tennessee
differs from the federal burden." Id at 8.
186. Idat6-7.
187. Id.
188. Idat9.
189. Id.
190. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 n.5 (Tenn. 1993).
191. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 9 n.6. The court in Hannan did not forget about movants who
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This second way' of shifting the burden originates in Justice Brennan's
dissent in Celotex.192 There, Justice Brennan took the position that a movant
could shift the burden of production by "demonstrat[ing] to the court that the
nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of
the nonmoving party's claim." 193 Missing from Justice Brennan's formulation
was the crucial phrase, "at trial." Indeed, Justice Brennan went on to note, "If
the nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to make out its claiml, a
trial would be useless and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." 194 Clearly, Justice Brennan's focus was on the state of the
nonmovant's evidence at the time of the motion, 15while the Tennessee
Supreme Court's formulation refers to the state of the nonmovant's evidence
at the time oftrial.1 96 The court recognized this distinction in Hannan,stating,

will bear the burden of proof at trial. In a footnote, the court stated, "[A] defendant asserting an
affirmative defense, such as laches, shifts the burden of production by alleging undisputed facts
that show the existence of the affirmative defense." Id. Here, the court also recognized that the
phrase "conclusively establish" in the Byrd formulation was inconsistent with a burden-shifting
analysis. Id. at 6; cf.Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n.5. That is, all a movant can do-whether it has
the burden of proof at trial or not-is to shift the burden of production to the nonmovant;
whether an affirmative defense is "conclusively established" can be determined only after the
nonmovant has had the opportunity to respond. See Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 5. The court applied
the affirmative defense analysis inStewart v. Chalet Village Properties,Inc., No. E2007-01499SC-Ri Il-CV, 2009 WL 3 616611 (Tenn. Nov. 3, 2009) (designated not for publication). In a slip
and fall case arising from a weekend cabin rental, the plaintiff had signed a lease containing an
exculpatory clause. Id. at * 1. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis of the
exculpatory clause. Id. at *2. The plaintiff did not dispute the existence of the exculpatory
clause but argued that it violated public policy. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment,
but the court of appeals reversed on the ground that the clause violated public policy. Id. The
supreme court held that "Chalet Village shifted the burden of production by alleging undisputed
facts showing the existence of the exculpatory clause, an affirmative defense." Id.Because the
plaintiff did not dispute the existence of the exculpatory clause, the only issue was one of lawwhether the exculpatory clause violated public policy. Id. at *3. Because the trial court did not
explicitly apply the appropriate factors, and because the record did not contain the management
agreement between the cabin owner and the rental agency, the court remanded for further
proceedings. Id. at* 4-.
192. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193. Idat 3 31.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 330-3 1.
196. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 7. This portion of the court's holding has distressed some
practitioners. See, e.g., Chambliss, supranote 115, at 12-13 ("Without a doubt, contrary to the
conclusion set forth in Hannan, the time for a nonimovant to make a factual showing is on or
before the days of hearing of the motion for summary judgment.... The finding by the Hannan
opinion that summary judgment issues are decided upon the basis of what the nonmovant can
prove at trial, as opposed to the state of the record on the day of the hearing, is, respectfully, not
consistent with Byrd and procedurally inconsistent with Rule 56.").
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Justice Brennan . .. would give the moving party the easier burden of
demonstrating that the nonmoving party's evidence-at the summary
judgment stage-is insufficient to establish an essential element. Therefore,
the standard we adopted in Byrd clearly differs from Justice
Brennan's
197
standard and poses a heavier burden for the moving party.
Clearly, in articulating this alternative means of shifting the burden to the
nonmovant, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the federal approach to
summary judgment as a way of testing the sufficiency of the nonovant's
evidence pre-trial. In Tennessee, the movant has to produce negative evidence
or has to somehow show that, at the time of trial, the nonmovant will be unable
to prove an essential element of the claim. 19 8 It is utterly insufficient in
Tennessee for a movant to merely allege that the plaintiffs' evidence at that
stage is insufficient to prove an essential element of its case. 19In Tennessee, a
nonmovant does not have to "show its hand" at sumnmayv judgment; the

nonmovant is given until the time of trial to prove its case. 2(O2

Not surprisingly, Justice Koch dissented in Hannan. 1Apparently
influenced by the appellant's unwillingness to acknowledge the long lineage of
Tennessee's summary judgment standard, Justice Koch characterized the
majority opinion as a "dramatic change in established summary judgment
practice," and asserted that the Hannandecision "brushes aside fifteen years of
post-Byrd v. Hall decisions." 2 02 According to Justice Koch, the federal
standard should be adopted (or, in his view, reaffirmed by the supreme court)
for two reasons. First, increasing litigation is overburdening Tennessee courts,
203
and only the federal standard is effective in "weeding out meritless claims."
Second, only the federal standard enables summary judgment to function as an
effective trial management device, forcing nonmovants to obtain needed

197. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 7 (citation omitted).
198. Id. at 9. This second alternative-"show[ing] that the nonmoving party cannot prove
an essential element of the claim at trial"-has not yet been interpreted by the supreme court. It
suggests that the movant must show now that something is impossihle later. One jurist has
suggested that this alternative could be satisfied by showing that a claim rests on a physical
impossibility, such as the sun's rising in the west or suspension of the laws of gravity.
Presentation by Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr., supra note 134. Anotherjudge has suggested that
this alternative could be satisfied by showing that the pretrial order prohibits presentation of
certain evidence at trial, usually because evidence was obtained too late. Remarks by
Chancellor Daryl Fansler, supra note 4; accordMcDaniel v. Rustom, No. W2008-00674-COAR3-CV, 2009 WL 1211335, at * 13-15 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2009). This strategy suggests
that defendants should strive for greater use of pretrial orders with firm cut-off dates for
completion of discovery and exchange of evidence. See infra text accompanying notes 283-88.
199. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 8.
200. Id
201. Id at 11I(Koch, J., dissenting).
202. Id at 17.
203. Id at 19.
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evidence in a timely manner.2 0 Predicting that the Hannan decision will
benefit those "who are unprepared, 2 05 Justice Koch noted that "this case
creates a safe harbor for two plaintiffs who, almost four years after they filed
their complaint, are still unable to substantiate their claim that Alltel
Publishing Company's . . . failure to include their listings in the local
telephone book caused them $225,000 in damages. 0 Applying the federal
standard to this case, Justice Koch opined that Alltel's showing was sufficient
to trigger the Hannans' burden of producing evidence as to the existence and

amount of their damages. 207 In his view, their failure to produce any such

evidence justified the entry of summary judgment against them.2 0
The majority addressed each of Justice Koch's points. First, the court
rejected any suggestion that its departure from the federal standard was recent:
[W]e are upholding over ten years of Tennessee Supreme Court precedent,
beginning with this Court's reiteration of the Byrd principles in MeCarley
and continuing in Blan chard,Staples, and Blair. Our decision today is true to
MeCarley throughBlair. It is Justice Koch's view that, if adopted, effectively
would overturn ten years of post-Byrd precedent. 0
Next, the court refuted Justice Koch's assertion that the federal standard is
needed because an increase of litigation is overburdening Tennessee courts by
noting that "the clearance rate of civil cases in Tennessee has hovered between
93% and 100% over the last eight years during which
the summary judgment
210
standard refined in MeCarley has been the rule."
With respect to Justice Koch's assertion that Tennessee's standard benefits
slothful nonmovants, the court clearly signaled that in Tennessee, summary
judgment is not a docket management device. The court closely parsed the
substantive law of contracts in explaining why the Hannans could wait until
the trial to present evidence of the amount of their damages: "The existence of
damages cannot be uncertain, speculative, or remote. The amount of damages
may be uncertain, however, if the plaintiff lays a sufficient foundation to allow
the trier of fact to make a fair and reasonable assessment of damages. 1
204. Id at 19-20.
205. Id at 19.
206. Id at 20. When asked at oral argument whether the ilannans had an expert who was
prepared to testify on the issue of damages, the Hannans' attorney responded, "At this point, we
don't." Audio Recording of Oral Argument, supra note 177.
207. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 21 (Koch, J., dissenting).
208. Id
209. Id. at 9 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
210. Id at 9 (footnote omitted). The court also noted the statistic that in 2006, "Tennessee
ranked last among the states in civil filings per capita with 1,275 cases filed per 100,000
citizens." Id. at 9-10.
211. Id at 10 (citations omitted). As in MeCarley, the substantive law determines the
merits of a summary judgment motion. In MeCarley, the uncertainty of the expert was not
dispositive when the law permitted lay testimony about the food at issue. McCarley v. W.

2010]

2010]
SUMMRY JUDGMENT IN TENNESSEE33

337

Applying this law to the facts, the court noted that "[tlhe complaint and the
deposition testimony of both of the Hannans consistently allege the existence
of damages.... [But] neither party can quantify the amount of damages . 1
The court reasoned that "[a]t trial, the Hannans must provide a foundation that
would allow a fair and reasonable assessment of damages, and neither party
has indicated that this foundation cannot be provided."21 Consistent with its
previous rejection of the Celotex "put up or shut up" standard, the supreme
court clearly does not view summary judgment as a prod to force nonmovants
to obtain and reveal their evidence; the court insists that the trial is the
appropriate stage for presentation of proof. 214 Affirming the court of appeals'
decision reversing summary judgment, the supreme court remanded the case
for trial 2.
Interestingly, of the two questions the court of appeals encouraged the
supreme court to answer-"-( 1) the issue of exactly what is meant by
'negating' an element of plaintiff s claimn, and (2) whether Tennessee follows
the Sixth Circuit's 'put up or shut up' interpretation of Celotex",2 16-t he court
answered only the second, in the negative. 217 As to what is required to
"cnegate" an essential element of the claim, the court held only that Alltel's
motion had not done S0.218 A month or so after the Tennessee Supreme Court
remanded the case, the parties settled .2 19 The terms of the settlement were
confidential. 2

IV. SPOOKED By HANNAN? THE REAL TRAGEDY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
iN TENNESSEE

The real tragedy of Hannan is not that it has made summary judgment
impossible to achieve in Tennessee, but that it addressed only the issue of what
Tennessee law is, not what it should be. By making Hannan an interpretive
battle over Byrd2,
the parties lost the opportunity to argue why Celotex
Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998). Here, while the summary judgment
motion may have demonstrated that the Hannans were uncertain about the amount of damages
they had suffered, they were certain about the existence of damages. H-annan, 270 S.W.3d at 10.
The substantive law permits this lingering uncertainty. Id at 11.
212. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 10.
213. Id.

214. Id
215. Idatl11.
216. Hannan v. Alitel Publ'g Co., No. E2006-0 1353-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 208430, at *8
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2007).
217. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 10-11.
218. Idatil1.
219. Telephone interview with Lewis Kinnard, attorney for plaintiffs (Oct. 15, 2009).
220. Id
221. This interpretive battle over Byrdraised the fifteen-year-old case to an almost totemic
preeminence, at the expense of the intervening Tennessee Supreme Court cases. Those who
wish to promote a pro-Celotex reading of Byrd recognize that it can be so read only in isolation
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would be a preferable summary judgment standard for Tennessee. Instead of
asking the supreme court to overrule the Byrd-MeCarley-Blairline of casesin other words, instead of pitching its battle on the correct field and arguing for
a change in Tennessee law-the appellant insisted on defending a reading of
Byrd and its progeny that was disingenuous at best. 222 Concomitantly, by
necessarily expending so much energy reaffirming what had already been
made clear in MeCarley, the court lost the opportunity to address why its
standard is superior to the Celotex standard.
Summary judgment is a screening device used to identify those cases that
are not trial-worthy. 2 No screening device is perfect. One that is too rigorous
will screen out trial-worthy cases; one that is too lenient will permit cases that
are not trial-worthy toypass through the summary judgment stage and perhaps
enter the trial stage . The explicit goal of the rules of civil procedure is to
achieve the 'lust, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding."125 Of course, these three goals-justice, speed, and economyexist in tension with one another. At many points in interpreting the rules,
courts must choose to promote one goal over the other. For example, whether
to require specificity in pleading, whether to allow liberal amendment, and
whether to permit extensive or prolonged discovery-all of these decisions
embody a policy choice, implicit or explicit. We must choose which type of
screen better serves the interests we wish to advance. If we value efficiency22
over justice, we will choose a tighter screen that will weed out more cases,
including some that would ultimately prove trial-worthy. If we value justice
over efficiency, we will choose a looser screen-one that will screen out fewer
cases and will permit some to go forward that would ultimately prove not
worthy of a trial.
Tennessee has traditionally favored merits-based determinations over
efficiency. As we have seen, even in its limited precursors to summary
judgment, Tennessee urisprudence was highly skeptical of deciding any issue
on the papers alone.2 And the greater specificity of Tennessee's Rule 56 in
contrast to the federal rule demonstrates skepticism about a less-than228
thoughtful summary judgment practice.
Another relevant distinction
between state and federal law is the relative informality of discovery in

from later precedent. Compare Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 7, 7 n.4 with id. at 16 (Koch, J.,
dissenting); accord Chambliss, supra note 115; Remarks by Chancellor Daryl Fansler, supra
note 4; Presentation by Judge Wheeler Rosenbaim, supra note 169.
222. One article published during the pendency of the Hannan appeal argued that
Tennessee should adopt a modified Celotex standard.See Pepke, supra note 115, at 12.
223. 16 TENN. JUR. Judgments and Decrees § 91, at 425 (2006).
224. Whether such cases will, in fact, enter the trial stage depends upon a number of
factors, including the settlement value (or lack thereof) of the case.
225. TENN. R. Civ. P. 1.
226. 1 refer to the goals of speed and economy by a single term: "efficiency."
227. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
228. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 56 with TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.
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Tennessee. Unlike the federal system, Tennessee does not mandate initial
disclosures, discovery conferences, or discovery plans. 229 Although in
Tennessee the formal discovery devices can be used much earlier in the casefor example, interrogatories can be served and filed simultaneously with the
complaint or answer 23-the absence of initial disclosures and formal
discovery plans means that discovery is more haphazard in Tennessee state
courts than in federal courts. The mandate of initial disclosures, especially,
means that the parties in federal court have earlier, more consistent, and more
comprehensive information than do their counterparts in state court. And this
early information, in turn, permits a more rational and efficient development of
formal discovery. A federal litigant who moves for summary judgment usually
does so only after a systematic series of disclosures and responses to
discovery. In contrast, a summary judgment motion in Tennessee state court is
less likely to be predicated on robust discovery .
Obviously, it makes more sense to make summary judgment a test of
evidentiary strength when the evidence in the case is accessible to both parties
via thorough, consistent, systematic discovery than where there is no mandated
uniform system of disclosure. Because Tennessee does not require initial
disclosures, discovery conferences, or discovery plans' 232 Courts are rightly
more wary of dispositive motions predicated on a party's lack of proof. Where
discovery is more dependent on resources and more subject to the whims or
strategemns of counsel, it is more logical for courts to conclude that a litigant's
legal rights should not be concluded solely on the basis of gaps in the evidence
revealed during discovery.
But a screen loose enough to allow the Hannans to wait until trial to
present evidence of the amount of their damages makes many members of the
bench and bar want to howl at the moon.
They believe that permittin~
parties like the Hannans to proceed to trial will waste judicial resources.23
After all, if a party cannot provide proof of an essential element during
discovery, what makes anyone think that party will produce the proof on the
day of trial? 235 There will be many voluntary dismissals at the courthouse door
or directed verdicts at the conclusion of the plaintiffs case, resulting in a

229.

Compare FED.

R. Civ. P. 26 with TENN. R. Civ. P. 26. The Tennessee Supreme Court

has recently approved an amendment to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02 permitting
discovery of insurance coverage. The amendment will take effect July 1, 2010, subject to the
approval of the General Assembly. Order In re: Amendment to Rule 26, Tennessee Rules of
Civil Procedure (filed Dec. 14, 2009).
230. TENN. R. Civ. P. 33.01 advisory commission's comment to 1979 amendment.
23 1. This is not to suggest that federal discovery is necessarily superior to discovery in
Tennessee state courts. Tennessee's less standardized discovery may permit a more flexible,
customized approach to discovery in particular cases.
232. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 26.
233. See Presentation by Judge Wheeler Rosenbalm, supra note 169.
234. See id. at 2-3.; accord Chambliss supra note 115, at 17.
235. See Presentation by Judge Wheeler Rosenbalm, supra note 169, at 3.
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waste of time for the court, the parties, and the witnesses. From a defendant's
perspective, permitting parties like the Hannans to go to trial will put those
plaintiffs in a better position to coerce settlements due to the added costs of
236
trial preparation ,
especially in the face of undiscovered proof by the
plaintiff.
Those troubled by these nightmarish visions can take some comfort in
knowing that negating an essential element of the nonmovant's case is usually

fairly simple. 237 Even though the Hannan court failed to precisely define what
it means to "negate" an essential element of the plaintiff s claim, a few things
are clear. First, despite the language of Rule 56, and the black letter principle
that the burden is on the movant to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue
of material fact for trial, in reality, Tennessee's burden-shifting standard means
that the movant' s onl~y initial burden is to negate an essential element of the
nonmovant's claim.2 It is impossible in Tennessee for the movant, in its
initial filing, to satisfy the burden of demonstrating the absence of a material
fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. All the movant can do
is to shift the burden of production to the nonmovant. Only after the
nonmovant responds, or fails to do so, may the court determine whether there
is a genuine issue of material fact. If the nonmovant responds, its burden is to
create a genuine issue of material fact or to show why the movant is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Indeed, most summary judgment cases
are decided based on the motion and the nonmnovant's response . 23 9 Therefore,
in Tennessee, the black letter burden of Rule 56 is actually inverted: it is the
nonmovant who must prove that there is a genuine issue of material fact, not
236. As one practitioner put it, "For defense lawyers, 'if you lose at summary judgment,
you have lost for your client.' . . . I think people are upset with the stricter standard [of
Hannan], not because more cases will go to trial, but because more non[-]deserving cases will
be settled." E-mail from Marshall W. Stair, to Judy M. Cornett (Dec. 31, 2009, 10:16 EST) (on
file with the Tennessee Law Review).
237. The most difficult type of case in which to negate may be the typical "slip and fall"
case, partly because of the difficulty defendants may experience in negating actual or
constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition.
238. Under Tennessee's standard, it is impossible for the movant to "conclusively"
establish anything in its motion. Although Byrd and its progeny established that the second way
for a movant to carry its burden was to "conclusively establish an affirmative defense," the
Hannan court abandoned this formulation. 270 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Tenn. 2008).
239. See, e.g., Cupp v. Dixie Cycle Sales, Inc., No. OlAO1-9410-CV-00492, 1995 WL
247965, at *3, *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1995) (movant's expert affidavit sufficientto shift
burden; nonmovant's response insufficient to raise genuine issue); Damron v. Wilson, No.
OlAO1-9310-CV-00448, 1994 WL 265790, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 1994) (in legal
malpractice case, burden shifted by movant attorney's own affidavit, and nonimovant's own lay
affidavit was insufficient response); Sutherland v. Food Lion, Inc., No. 0OlAOlI-9309-CV-00414,
1994 WL 108889, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1994) (nonmovant's response after burden
shift insufficient to overcome movant's affidavits by store employees); Johnson v. Dickinson,
No. 02A01I-9304-CV-00083, 1993 WL 541032, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1993) (finding
nonmnovant's response after burden shift insufficient to overcome movant's affidavit).
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the movant who must prove there is not.2 Understanding this elegant burdenshifting procedure is vital to understanding what it means to negate an
essential element of the nonmovant's claim.2
Second, the movant cannot shift the burden by "submitting an affidavit
that is merely conclusory . 4 This principle originated in Blanchard v.
Kellum.2 4 In that case, the plaintiff alleged medical malpractice and medical
battery, 4 and the defendant dentist moved for summary judgment, attaching
to her motion an affidavit stating that she "provided acceptable medical
treatment and did not violate the standard of care." 245 However, the affidavit
240. Stanfill v. Mountain, No. M2006-01072-SC-Rl l-CV, 2009 WL 4406059, at * 1
(Tenn. Dec. 3, 2009); Kenyon v. Handal, 122 S.W.3d 743, 758 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Of
course, theoretically, we may say that the nonmovant's response merely shifts the burden back
to the movant to prove that there is no genuine issue of material fact, but that second shift rarely
occurs. See cases cited supra note 239.
241. See Hannan v. Aitel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tenn. 2008). The elegant burdenshifting analysis established in McCarley is one of the primary virtues of Tennessee's summary
judgment standard. Analyzing whether the motion has triggered the nonmovant's burden of
production requires disciplined examination of the motion and supporting materials. Similarly,
determining whether the nonovant has met its burden of creating a genuine issue of material
fact requires disciplined consideration of the response. The court in McCarley chastised the
lower court for not engaging in a systematic analysis. McCarley v. W. Quality Food Serv., 960
S.W.2d 585, 587-88 (Tenn. 1998). However, in a recent case, Mills v. CSX Transportation,
Inc., 300 S.W.3d 627 (Tenn. 2009), the court, speaking through Chief Justice Holder, the author
of McCarley, appeared to retreat from its demand for systematic analysis of the burden-shifting:
Although the ...burden-shifting analysis can be an important tool in deciding whether
summary judgment is appropriate, it is not always necessary to engage in this exercise
when the nonmoving party has clearly stated a genuine issue of material fact that would
preclude summary judgment as a matter of law.
Id at 634. It is not clear why the court would suggest that lower courts forgo the analysis the
court established in MeCarley. Perhaps the court believes that the precise analysis requires too
much time and energy from lower courts, especially in "easy"~ cases. Or, perhaps, the court
believes that the Hannan standard will be more palatable if the bench and bar are reminded that
many summary judgment appeals harbor genuine issues of material fact created by nonmovants
even when they were not required to do so. In other words, in cases like AM'cCarley and M'ills,
denial of summary judgment is easier to accept based on the alternative holding-that the
nonmovant's response created a genuine issue of material fact.
242. Andr~e Sophia Blumstein, Bye, Bye Byrd? Summary Judgment After Hannan and
Martin: Which Way to Go?, TENN. B.J., Feb. 2009, at 23, 25.
243. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 8 (citing Blanchard v. Kellum, 975 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tenn.
1998)).
244. A cause of action for medical battery arises
if the patient did not know that the procedure was going to be performed, or if the patient
did not authorize the performance of the procedure .... For medical battery, the plaintiff
is not required to provide expert medical testimony, because the patient's knowledge and
awareness is the focus in such a claim.
Hensley v. Scokin, 148 S.W.3d 352, 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted).
245. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 8 (citing Blanchard v. Kellum, 975 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tenn.
1998)).
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failed to identify the ap ropriate standard of care 246 or to address the plaintiff s
medical battery claim. The supreme court held that the defendant's affidavit

was insufficient to shift the burden of production to the plaintiff.248 The Court

in Hannan cited Blanchard for the proposition that "[w]e reversed the
summary judgment because this conclusory affidavit in support of her motion
failed to negate an essential element of the plaintiffs claim or establish an
affirmative defense." 249 But Hannan should not be read as holding, or even
suggesting, that a professional defendant's own affidavit is necessarily
"cconclusory." On the contrary, a professional defendant's affidavit that he or
she met an identified standard of care applicable to the claim raised by the
plaintiff would be sufficient to shift the burden of production, as the Tennessee
250
Court of Appeals has held in numerous decisions.
246.
247.

Blanchard v. Kellum, 975 S.W.2d 522, 523 (Tenn. 1998).
Id. at 525.

248. Id.
249. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 8 (citing Blanchard, 975 S.W.2d at 525).
250. See, e.g, Payne v. Shumake, No. W1999-02059-COA-R3-CV, 1999 WL 1336048
(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1999); Damron v. Wilson, No. O1AO1-9310-CV-00448, 1994 WL
265790, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 1994) (summary judgment appropriate in legal
malpractice case where burden was shifted by movant attorney's own affidavit and
nonmovant's own lay affidavit was insufficient response); Johnson v. Dickinson, No. 02A01I9304-CV-00083, 1993 WL 541032, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1993) (filing of defendant
attorney's affidavit shifted burden to plaintiff).
In a recent Tennessee Supreme Court case, Stanfill v. Mountain, No. M2006-0 1072SC-Ri I1-CV, 2009 WL 4406059 (Tenn. Dec. 3, 2009), homebuyers sued the sellers for, inter
alia, fraudulent concealment of mold in the home. Id. at * 1. An essential element of fraudulent
concealment is the defendant's actual or constructive knowledge of the condition. Id. at *3. The
court held that the following statement in the seller's affidavit was sufficient to negate the
element of knowledge: ...
[a]t the time of sale, I had no actual knowledge of the presence of any
type of mold in the residence or any of the other buildings located on the property."' Id.
Chief Justice Holder, concurring and dissenting, disagreed that this affidavit was
sufficient to negate an essential element of the plaintiff s claim. Id. at * 14 (Holder, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting). She characterized the quoted statement as "little more than a denial
of the allegations contained in the complaint and, as such,.... insufficient to shift the burden of
production to the Stanfills." Id. at * 13. This rationale for her dissent (combined with a nonnuanced reading of Blanchard) may create concern in cases of professional malpractice, in
which the defendant's own affidavit has traditionally been accepted by the court of appeals as
negating the elements of negligence, causation, or both, requiring the plaintiff to produce
admissible expert evidence of violation of the standard of care.
In an alternative rationale for her dissent, Chief Justice Holder pointed out that the
denial of "actual" knowledge was insufficient to negate the "knowledge" element of the tort
because constructive knowledge can satisfy the element. Id. at * 14. Also, she opined, the
affidavit focused solely on the time of sale and did not negate knowledge prior to the time of
sale. Id. Helpfully providing specific language for future litigants, Chief Justice Holder stated,
If the defendants' affidavits had stated, "At no time from the date of purchase of the
property to the date of sale was I aware or made aware of any type of mold in the
residence or any of the other buildings located on the property," I would agree that the
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Justice Koch actually posited the best example of a case in which a movant
who could shift the burden under the federal standard would not be able to do
so under the Tennessee standard: an attack on the qualifications of the
plaintiff s expert in a medical malpractice case .251 As Justice Koch noted, the
defendant cannot shift the burden of production to the plaintiff in Tennessee
courts by showing that the "plaintiffs expert is not qualified to render an

opinion,

252

for example, because of her failure to meet the locality rule. 253

Showing that this particular expert does not qualify to render an opinion
neither negates an essential element of the plaintiff s claim, nor does it show
that the plaintiff cannot prove an essential element at trial .2 Again, Justice
Koch correctly noted that "rather than the litigation ending with the
disqualification of the expiert, it will continue while the plaintiff attempts to
find yet another expert.",2 15 Or, at least, this will be true if the defendant, in its
summary judgment motion, merely attacks the plaintiffs expert's
qualifications. If, instead, the defendant presents an expert affidavit (including
the defendant's own affidavit where the defendant is an expert) that negates an
essential element of the plaintiff s claim (usually, negligence or causation or
both), then the burden will shift to the plaintiff to present evidence creating a
genuine issue of material fact. 256 If at that point the plaintiff produces only an
unqualified expert, the defendant can obtain summary judgment because the
plaintiffs production of inadmissible evidence is insufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact. 257 Thus, the defendant can certainly attack the

defendants satisfied their burden of production.
Id The lesson of Blanchardand Stanfill with respect to "conclusory affidavits" is this: Draft
your supporting affidavits to meet, precisely and thoroughly, the specific element of the
plaintiff s claim that you seek to negate.
251. See Hannan,270 S.W.3d at 19-20 (Koch, J., dissenting).
252. Id.at20.
253. Geesling v. Livingston Reg'l Hosp., LLC, No. M2007-02726-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL
5272476, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2008) ("The locality rule requires that an expert
establish a familiarity with the standard of care in that medical community or a similar medical
community.")
254. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 20.
255. Id.But see McDaniel v. Rustom, No. W2008-00674-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WYL 1211335
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2009) (summary judgment for defendant affirmed when only expert
identified by discovery cutoff date failed to meet the locality rule).
256. See Geesling, 2008 WL 5272476, at *4 (movant, medical malpractice defendant, filed
expert affidavit, and plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with affidavit from
expert who did not satisfy locality rule); see generally Kenyon v. Handal, 122 S.W.3d
743 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (reviewing use of expert affidavit in medical malpractice cases).
257. Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.06 requires that evidence supporting the
response "set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence." TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.06; see,
e.g., Geesling, 2008 WL 5272476, at *4; Keith v. Witt, 919 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1995) (in medical malpractice action, nonmovant's responsive affidavit was inadmissible and
therefore insufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact).
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qualifications of the plaintiff s expert-it just takes a little more effort on the
front end to trigger the burden of production.
The hundreds of summary judgment cases decided by the court of appeals
between Byrd and Hannan demonstrate that the vast majority of summary
judgment motions are supported by negating evidence.2 Even in cases in
which summary judgment is not granted, or is granted and reversed, it would
be possible to obtain such evidence. For example, in Hannan, Alltel
Publishing could have iresented expert testimony negating the existence and
amount of damages.25 In MeCarley, the defendant could have presented
expert testimony that the chicken did not cause the food poisoning.26 In
Blanchard, to negate the medical battery claim,
the defendant could have
2 61

presented a consent form signed by the plaintiff.

When we discuss Tennessee's summary judgment standard, the elephant
in the room is that Tennessee's standard is assumed to be pro-plaintiff and
anti-defendant. Because most summary judgment motions are filed by
defendants, and because on most issues the defendant will not have the burden
of proof at trial, Tennessee's summary judgment standard forces the defendant
who wishes to file a motion for summary judgment to do something that he or
she would not have to do at trial: produce evidence. To some, this requirement
seems unfair.2 6 Why, they ask, should the party not having the burden of
proof at trial have the burden of producing proof at the summary judgment
stage? 263 The answer is simple: the defendant has the burden because he or she
wants out early. Tennessee's summary judgment standard says, in effect: If
you want out of this lawsuit on the merits short of a trial, you must be willing
to bear some burden. If you do not wish to produce evidence, you can wait for
the trial and make a motion for directed verdict at the end of the plaintiffs
case in chief. But we will not substitute one for the other. Your impatience to
be exonerated comes at a price: you must produce evidence that negates an
essential element of the plaintiffs claim or demonstrates that the plaintiff

cannot prove an essential element of its claim at trial.26 put
Simply, in
2 65
Tennessee, summary judgment is not a pretrial directed verdict.
Those who argue that Tennessee's summary judgment standard is proplaintiff forget two facts: (1) in the vast majority of cases, it is fairly easy for
258. See Table of Summary

Judgment, supra note 80.

259.
260.

See Remarks by Chancellor Daryl Fansler, supra note 4.
Id.
261. See Blanchard v. Kellum, 975 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tenn. 1998).
262. One commentator exclaims, "Tennessee defendants may well find themselves in the
position of proving the negative-providing evidence of a fact that it would not have to
establish at trial!" Pepke, supra note 115, at 14.

263. Id.
264. Of course, as one lawyer put it, "The primary focus and central purpose of Rule 56 is
to provide an opportunity for a party (usually a defendant) to avoid the expense and delay of
enduring a trial." Chambliss, supra note 115, at 17.
265. Blair v. W. Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 768 (Tenn. 2004).
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the defendant to negate an essential element of the plaintiffs case; and (2)
once the burden is shifted, in practical terms, Tennessee's standard puts the
burden of demonstrating a genuine issue ofmaterial fact on the plaintiff. There
is, therefore, a balance between the burdens imposed on the defendant and the
plaintiff: the defendant may have to do a little more initially, but ultimately the
plaintiff has to do a lot more.
Tennessee is not unique in rejecting Celotex. At least eight other states
reject Celotex as well: Alaska, 6 Connecticut, 267 Florida, 268 Indiana, 269
Kentucky, 270 New MeXiCo, 2 7 1 Oklahoma, 2 72 and Texas. 2 73 The fact that
Tennessee's standard requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that a genuine issue
of material fact exists actually makes it more favorable to defendants than
some other states' standards. In Indiana, for example, the supreme court
interprets Rule 56's directive that the movant must show the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact to mean that the movant must negate all genuine
issues of material fact before the burden of responding is shifted to the
nonmovant. 274
2 Similarly, in Oklahoma, once the burden is shifted to the
nonmovant, the nonmovant does not have to produce admissible evidence, but
must only "'present something"' 2 75 to show the "reasonable probability" that
by the day of trial he will have competent, admissible evidence to support the
claim.276
Tennessee's summary judgment standard requires more attention by all
attorneys to their Rule 11 duties. Recall that Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 prohibits an attorney from "presenting" any claim to the court
unless "to the best of [the attorney's] knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . . (3) the

allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if

266. See Barry v. Univ. of Alaska, 85 P.3d 1022, 1025-26 (Alaska 2004).
267. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, 848 A.2d 1165, 1172 (Conn. 2004).
268. See 5G's Car Sales, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement, 581 So. 2d 212,212 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
269. See Dennis v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 831 N.E.2d 171, 173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
270. See Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Cent., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).
One commentator has stated that Steelvest was "modifi[ed]" by Ross v. Powell. 206 S.W.3d 327
(Ky. 2006). Pepke, supra note 115, at 15 n.15. However, Ross did not affect Kentucky's
rejection of the Celotex standard for summary judgment.
271. See Bartlett v. Mirabal, 999 P.2d 1062, 1065-66 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting the
Anderson, and, by implication, Celotex, approach to summary judgment).
272. See Kating v. City of Pryor, 977 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998).
273. See Lesbrookton, Inc. v. Jackson, 796 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. App. 1990).
274. See Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994).
275. Paul J. Cleary, Summary Judgment in Oklahoma: Suggestions for Improving a
"Disfavored" Procedure, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 251, 261 (1994) (quoting Weeks v.
Westwood Vill., Inc., 554 P.2d 780, 784 (Okla. 1976)).
276. Id. at 263.
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specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary sup~port after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery."7
Attorneys should not file complaints unless they have evidence to support
those complaints or unless they believe it "likely" that supporting evidence
will emerge during discovery or post-filing investigation.27 Because the duties
that attach to "presenting" a claim apply to "later advocating" it, the attorney
must reassess his or her position if supporting evidence does not appear during
discovery or post-filing investigation. 7 It may well be that after the
conclusion of discovery, a party not having the burden of proof would be
justified in writing a "safe harbor" letter to the other party, giving that party
the chance to withdraw the claim to avoid Rule I11 sanctions .280 Such a letter
may prod the party into producing supporting evidence or (in a more cynical
view) prompt a reasonable settlement offer.
Similarly, attorneys who contemplate filing a motion for summary
judgment must comply with Rule 11. Especially relevant to movants is Rule
11.02(2), which requires that "the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions" in a "written motion" be "warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law or the establishment of new law." 281 Thus, an attorney who files a motion
for summary judgment in Tennessee state court is certifying that the motion
either negates an essential element of the nonmovant's case or shows that the
nonmovant cannot prove an essential element of its case at trial. A motion that
does neither violates Rule 11, unless the attorney is asking for an "extension,
282
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law."
My suggestion here-that Tennessee's summary judgment standard
should heighten attorneys' awareness of their Rule I11 duties-may suggest an
unhealthy shift of policing meritless claimis and motions from the Rule 56
arena to the Rule I11 arena, an arena that has traditionally been distasteful to
attorneys. However, underlying my suggestion is the (perhaps idealistic) idea
that attorneys can and do police themselves through Rule 11. After all, even if
the opposing party cannot succeed on a motion for summary judgment because
it cannot negate an essential element of the nonovant's claiml, how does that
prosper the nonmovant? The nonmovant gets additional timle, sure, but unless
that party spends more time in investigation or discovery, the absence of proof
will simply rear its head at trial. Realistically, perhaps, the futile summary
judgment motion and the additional timne to produce evidence is simply used as
ammunition for a better settlement. It may be cheaper for a defendant to settle
a claim than to pay its attorney to prepare for trial. The fear of jury
277.

TNN. R. Civ. P. 11. 02(3).

278.
279.

Id
TENN.

R. Civ. P. 11.02.

280. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 11.03(l)(a). A "safe harbor" letter gives the attorney the chance
to withdraw the claim to avoid Rule 11Isanctions.
281. TENN. R. Civ. P. 11.02(2).
282. Id
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unpredictability also plays into the defendant's impulse to settle if summary
judgment is unavailable. However, in the small number of cases in which
Tennessee's summary judgment standard precludes summary judgment and in
which the plaintiff appears to lack proof of an essential element of its claim,
the defendant might be wise to proceed to trial. If the plaintiff fails to present
enough evidence to support a jury verdict, the defendant should receive a
directed verdict. And even if the case is submitted to the jury, a defense verdict
may well be rendered. Tennessee juries are not noted for their largesse to
undeserving plaintiffs.
The prospect of a trial's moving forward, potentially in the absence of
sufficient proof on the plaintiffs part-an absence that the defendant may
have already tried to bring to the trial court's attention via a summary
judgment motion-suggests that Tennessee's summary judgment standard also
requires greater utilization of pretrial and scheduling orders pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 16.28 The rule provides that a pretrial
conference may be scheduled "upon motion of any party." 8 One of the topics
that Rule 16 permits to be discussed is "the identification of witnesses and
documents ." The order emerging from the pretrial conference can certainly
set a reasonable deadline for identification of evidence by the party having the
burden of proof at trial. At that point, Rule 16 provides that "[i]f a party or
party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order,... the judge, upon
motion or the judge's own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto
as are just, and among others any of the orders provided in Rule 37.02 .~~
Among the sanctions provided in Rule 37.02 are the following:
(B3) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing
designated matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding
or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the
disobedient party.28
Again, like Rule 11I motions, Rule 3 7 motions have not been popular with
attorneys, perhaps because judges have been impatient with parties who cannot
work out their own discovery disagreements. However, ajudge whose pretrial
283.

See McDaniel v. Rustomn, No. W2008-00674-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 1211335, at

* 13-15 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5,2009); Chamnbliss, supra note 115, at 15. But see Dykes v. City

of Oneida, No. E2009-00717-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WYL 681375, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26,
2010).
284. TENN. R. Civ. P. 16.01.
285. TENN. R. Civ. P. 16.03(5).
286. TENN. R. Civ. P. 16.06.
287. TENN. R. Civ. P. 37.02(B)-(C).
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order is being disobeyed may well be more receptive to a remedial order, even
if it is brought pursuant to Rule 37. Pretrial orders have not been used
consistently in state courts throughout Tennessee. Some courts use them
routinely; others rarely use them.2 Thus, parties who would otherwise move
for summary judgment might find that asking the court for a pretrial
conference with an early date for disclosure of witnesses and documents is
more effective.
Tennessee's summary judgment standard may actually make potential
movants' discovery more efficient. That is, a party who anticipates filing a
motion for summary judgment might be well advised to spend money on
developing its own negative proof rather than spending money to poke holes in
the nonmovant's proof. In Hannan, the defendant would have been better off
hiring its own accountant instead of deposing the plaintiffs .2 89 However
uncertain they may be ,2 plaintiffs are unlikely to disprove their cases out of
their own mouths. In Tennessee, nonmovant uncertainty does not equal
291
negation. Of course, there are other good reasons to depose the opposing
parties and their witnesses, but if the case seems vulnerable to summary
judgment, it might be better for the movant to hire an expert, file the summary
judgment motion, and see what the nonmovant provides in response. If there is
a response, the standards articulated in Martin v. Norfolk Southern Railway
Co. will determine whether it is sufficient . If it is sufficient, the summary
judgment motion will be denied, but discovery can continue and the response
may provide a bit of a roadmap for further discovery. 9
Given the now-inarguable divergence between state and federal summary
judgment practice in Tennessee, forum selection decisions take on added
significance. 9 Plaintiffs need to think hard before filing in federal court if
their case would be vulnerable to a Celotex motion. A plaintiff who needs time
288. See Chambliss, supra note 115, at 15.
289. See Hannan v. Ailtel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tenn. 2008).
290. See Mills v. CSX Transp., Inc., 300 S.W.3d 627, 633 (Tenn. 2009); Hannan, 270
S.W.3d at 4 n.
291. S~ee M'ills, 300 S.W.3d 627; H-annan, 270 S.W.3d 1; McCarley v. W. Quality Food
Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1998); see also Dykes v. City of Oneida, No. E2009-00717COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 681375 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2010).
292. 271 S.W.3d 76, 84 (Tenn. 2008) ("The nonrmoving party may satisfy its burden of
production by: '(1) pointing to evidence establishing material factual disputes that were overlooked or ignored by the moving party; (2) rehabilitating the evidence attacked by the moving
party; (3) producing additional evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue for trial;
(4) submitting an affidavit explaining the necessity for further discovery pursuant to Tenn. R.
Civ. P., Rule 56.06."' (quoting McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588)).
293.

Of course, in that case, make sure any pretrial or scheduling order that is entered

permits an early motion and continued discovery if the motion is denied. See

TENN. R. Civ. P.

16.
294.

Blumstein, supranote 242, at 27 ("Forum

selection may make a difference in certain

cases in which motions for summary judgment will play an important part.").
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to develop proof, or whose expected proof may be comparatively weaker than
the defendant's, is better off in Tennessee state court. Conversely, a defendant
in such a case would be better off in federal court, and can get there, of course,
295
if removal jurisdiction is proper. Plaintiffs who have cases vulnerable to a
Celotex motion may have additional incentives to sculpt their lawsuit to avoid
removal, if at all possible. 9
V. CONCLUSION
Hannan did not work a revolution in Tennessee summary judgment law. It
did clarify that a movant cannot "conclusively establish" an affirmative
defense with its initial motion. 9 It also demonstrated the depth of the
Tennessee Supreme Court's commitment to the Byrd-MeCarley-Blair
standard by applying it in such an unattractive case, one that surely would
have garnered summary judgment under the federal standard .2 98 After Hannan,
trial judges must be more mindful of the systematic analysis required in
evaluating the sufficiency of a summary judgment motion, and attorneys for
all parties need to be especially conscious of their Rule 11I duties. Attorneys
for potential movants need to utilize pretrial conferences and orders to a
greater extent to make sure the party not having the burden of proof is required
to show its hand prior to trial, and they would be well advised to spend
resources on developing their own negative proof rather than showing the
deficiencies in the nonovant's evidence. The Byrd-MeCarley-Blair standard
has worked well for Tennessee for fifteen years; there is no reason to expect
that it will stop working after Hannan.
The Tennessee Supreme Court was not given the opportunity in Hannanto
articulate why it rejects Celotex. In this article, I have suggested many
justifications for that position. But my justifications cannot substitute for the
295. See 28 U.S.C. §§1441 1453 (2006).
296. It goes without saying, I hope, that any such sculpting must be consistent with Rule
11. TENN~. R. Civ. P. 11. However, even if removal is proper, query whether the Erie doctrine
would require the federal court sitting in diversity tn apply the Tennessee summary judgment
standard. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts sitting in
diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive state law). In my earlier article on Byrd v.
Hall, I assumned that it did not. Cornett, supra note 5, at 212 n.235. However, a thoroughgoing
Erie analysis, like that undertaken by then-Magistrate Murrian for Tennessee's thirteenth juror
rule, might suggest the opposite: that Tennessee's standard is "substantive" enough that it must
be used in diversity cases. Bivens v. Black, 35SF. Supp. 2d 607, 609-11 (E. D. Tenn. 1999). If
so, then the potential movant would gain nothing by removing, and the federal forum would
remain open for the plaintiff whose claims would otherwise have been vulnerable to a Celotex
motion. Tennessee practitioners are beginning to argue that the Erie doctrine requires
application of the Hannan standard in federal diversity cases. Reply Brief at 13-28, 1704
Farmington, LLC v. City of Memphis, No. 09-63 67 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2010) (on file with the
Tennessee Law Review).
297. See discussion supra note 191.
298. Hlannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5-9 (Tenn. 2008).
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court's explanations. Some of the other courts that have rejected Celotex have
explained their reasons for doing so. The courts of Florida, Kentucky, and
Oklahoma have noted that the federal standard grants more power to the judge
at the expense of the jury. 299 The courts of Kentucky, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and Texas also justify their standards on the ground that summary
judgment is a more disfavored procedure in their states than in the federal
system .300 The Kentucky Supreme Court explained why that state's summary
judgment standard differs from the directed verdict standard:
[T]he consideration to be given to the two motions is not the same and... a
ruling on a summary judgment is a more delicate mailer and... its inquiry
requires a greater judicial determination and discretion since it takes the case
away from the trier of fact before the evidence is actually heard. 0
This language was recently quoted in part by the Tennessee Supreme
Court ,302 perhaps giving a hint of the court's rationale. Tennessee's longstanding tradition of preferring merits-based determinations to efficiency
considerations would probably loom large in the court's reasoning. Given
Tennessee's strong constitutionally based right to trial by jury in civil cases,30
the court might also be concerned not to adopt a procedure that would
encroach on the province of the jury. Finally, the distinctions between federal
and state discovery tools would probably factor in to the court's reasoning.
Once the court is given the opportunity to fully explain its rejection of Celotex,
the real debate about the merits of the competing summary judgment standards
can begin.

299. See 5G's Car Sales, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement, 581 So. 2d 212,212 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Cent., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 481-82
(Ky. 1991); Kating v. City of Pryor, 977 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998).
300. See Steelvest, Inc., 807 S.W.2d at 482; Bartlettyv. Mirabal, 999 P.2d 1062, 1062 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2000); Kating 977 P.2d at 1142; Lesbrookton, Inc. v. Jackson, 796 S.W.2d 276, 276
(Tex. App. 1990).
301. Steelvest, Inc., 807 S.W.2d at 482.
302. Mills v. CSX Transp., Inc., 300 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tenn. 2009).

303. See

TENN. CONSI. art. 1, §

6 ("the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate").

